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Patently Impossible
64 Vand. L. Rev. 1491 (2011)
Sean B. Seymore
The quest to achieve the impossible fuels creativity, spawns
new fields of inquiry, illuminates old ones, and extends the frontiers
of knowledge. It is difficult, however, to obtain a patent for an
invention which seems impossible, incredible, or conflicts with wellestablished scientific principles. The principal patentability hurdle
is operability, which an inventor cannot overcome if there is reason
to doubt that the invention can really achieve the intended result.
Despite its laudable gatekeeping role, this Article identifies two
problems with the law of operability. First, though objective in
theory, the operability analysis rests on subjective credibility
assessments. These credibility assessments can introduce a bias
toward unpatentability, with inventions emerging from new, poorly
understood, and paradigm-shifting technologies as well as those
from fields with a poor track record of success as the most
vulnerable. Second, what happens when the impossible becomes
possible? History reveals that the Patent Office and the courts will
continue to deny patents for a long time thereafter.
This Article argues that the mishandling of seemingly
impossible inventions vitiates the presumption of patentability,
prevents the patent system from sitting at the cutting edge of
technology, and frustrates the patent system's overarching goal to
promote scientific and technologicalprogress. In an effort to resolve
these problems and fill a gap in patent scholarship, this Article
offers a new framework for gauging the patentability of seemingly
impossible inventions. Briefly, it contends that a more robust
enforcement of patent law's enablement requirement can and should
perform the gatekeeping role because it can resolve whether an
invention works by weighing objective, technical factors. This
approach would quickly reveal technical merit for inventions that
really work or, alternatively, the fatal flaw for inventions that are
truly impossible. Its implementation would not only eliminate the
need for the operability requirement, but it would also streamline
patent examination, improve the disclosure function of the patent
system, promote scientific and technological progress, and
ultimately foster innovation.
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The difficult, the dangerous, and the impossible have always had a
strangefascinationfor the human mind.
-- John Phin 1
INTRODUCTION

The growing backlog of patent applications in the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office ("PTO") and concerns about patent quality have
led to calls for patent reform. 2 Legal commentators argue that both
the backlog and quality problems stem, at least in part, from a large
number of patent applications that disclose worthless inventions. 3

1.
JOHN PHIN, THE SEVEN FOLLIES OF SCIENCE 1 (1906).
2.
See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV.
1495, 1500 (2001) [hereinafter Lemley, Rational Ignorance] (arguing that inadequate
examination leads the PTO to issue a large percentage of invalid patents); see also Doug
Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law's Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV.
45, 53-56 (2007) (exploring limitations on the extent and quality of PTO review). One cause for
the backlog is an increase in the number of patent application filings over time while the time
available for examiners to review applications has remained constant. See John L. King, Patent
Examination Proceduresand Patent Quality, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY
54, 63 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003) (presenting an empirical study).
Reform efforts began when reports surfaced in the early 2000s "that documented important
failings in the patent system, including laxity in the PTO examination process that let a number
of bad patents issue .... " DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE
COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 100 (2009).
3.
See, e.g., Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 2, at 1511 (finding that few patents
are litigated or licensed and ninety-five percent of patents are never used); see also ADAM B.
JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 173 (2004) (contending that most
patents are worthless). Wacky and absurd patents have received considerable attention in the
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Perhaps the best solution would be to ferret out these
applications at an early stage of patent examination. To some extent,
this already happens. Applications disclosing perpetual motion
machines; 4 cold fusion processes; 5 and other inventions that either
claim seemingly unachievable results, challenge well-established
scientific principles, or simply appear facially impossible, raise red
flags in the PTO. 6 The oft-cited statutory basis for rejecting them is
§ 101 of the Patent Act, which only permits patents for "useful"
inventions. 7 In patent law, an invention is not useful if it cannot
operate to produce the intended result.8 The test for operability is
whether a person having ordinary skill in the art ("PHOSITA")9 has
reason to doubt the objective truth of the applicant's assertions. 10
popular media. See generally TED VANCLEAVE, TOTALLY ABSURD INVENTIONS (2001); James
Gleick, PatentlyAbsurd, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 12, 2000, at 44.
4.
A perpetual motion machine can run forever without any input of external power,
meaning that it can do work without consuming energy. The oft-cited technical objection is that
perpetual motion violates the Second Law of Thermodynamics, which holds that a machine
cannot be 100 percent efficient because it can only use a fraction of the energy it receives for
work and must lose a significant portion to the environment as heat, usually through friction.
See discussion infra note 265; see also Dimitris Tsaousis, Perpetual Motion Machine, 1 J.
ENGINEERING SCI. & TECH. REV. 53, 53-57 (2008).
5.
See In re Swartz, 232 F.3d 862, 864 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (affirming the PTO's
rejection of a cold fusion device). Cold fusion describes a nuclear fusion reaction with hydrogen
that occurs at room temperature. Given that the fuel comes from water, a cold fusion apparatus
could provide a limitless and nonpolluting source of energy. See ERIC G. SWEDIN, SCIENCE IN THE
CONTEMPORARY WORLD 57-58 (2005). Critics contend that cold fusion is incompatible with
nuclear physics, which holds that hydrogen fusion requires temperatures of millions of degrees
Fahrenheit-as at the Sun's core. Id.
See infra Part II.A.
6.
7.
"Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
" 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (emphasis added).
composition of matter... may obtain a patent ....
Aside from utility, an invention must be novel, § 102, nonobvious, § 103, and directed to
1 requires that the application adequately
patentable subject matter, § 101. In addition, § 112
disclose the invention and § 112 1 2 requires that the application conclude with claims which
delineate the invention with particularity.
8.
See Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
("The utility requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 101 mandates that any patentable invention be useful
and, accordingly, the subject matter of the claim must be operable."); Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d
1575, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("[A] device lacks utility [if] it does not operate to produce what the
[inventor] claims [that] it does." (citation omitted)); cf. In re Perrigo, 48 F.2d 965, 966 (C.C.P.A.
1931) ("It is fundamental in patent law that an alleged invention ...must appear capable of
").The U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals ("C.C.P.A.") was
doing the things claimed ....
a predecessor to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit"). The
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 abolished the C.C.P.A. See Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat.
25 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). Soon after its creation, the Federal
Circuit adopted the C.C.P.A. decisional law as binding precedent. See South Corp. v. United
States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc).
9.
The PHOSITA isa hypothetical construct of patent law. See Panduit Corp. v. Dennison
Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (explaining that a PHOSITA is "not unlike the

1494

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:5:1491

However, using the operability requirement of § 101 as a
gatekeeper has several drawbacks. First, elucidating what a
PHOSITA would believe can devolve into a subjective judgment about
the subject matter. The PTO and the courts can develop a bias toward
unpatentability, with inventions emerging from new, poorly
understood, and paradigm-shifting technologies as well as those from
fields with a poor track record of success as the most vulnerable.11
Second and relatedly, since the PTO and the courts are probably
unaware of what is happening at the cutting edge of science and
technology, what happens when the impossible becomes possible?
History reveals that the PTO and the courts will continue to deny
patents under § 101 for a long time thereafter. 12 This time lag between
technical possibility and legal recognition is unsettling since "the very
purpose of the patent system is to encourage [the] attainment of
previously unachievable results."'1 3 The current § 101 regime
frustrates this purpose as well as the patent system's broader mission
to extend the frontiers of knowledge.
This Article offers a new framework for gauging the
patentability of seemingly impossible inventions. Briefly, it contends
that a more robust enforcement of the enablement requirement of
1-which obliges a patent applicant to disclose how to make
§ 112
and use the invention without undue experimentation-can effectively
ferret out truly impossible inventions by itself with no need for or help
from its § 101 statutory cousin. Importantly, § 112 1 can perform the
gatekeeping role by weighing objective, technical factors rather than
through subjective credibility assessments that lie at the heart of the

Ireasonable man' and other ghosts in the law").

Factors relevant to constructing the PHOSITA in
a particular technical field include the sophistication of the technology, the inventor's
educational level, the educational level of active workers in the field, the types of problems
encountered in the art, prior art solutions to those problems, and the rapidity with which
innovations are made. Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 697 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
10. The PTO can establish reasonable doubt if the applicant's disclosure "suggest[s] an
inherently unbelievable undertaking or involve[s] implausible scientific principles." In re
Cortright, 165 F.3d 1353, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (quoting In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed.
Cir. 1995)). A finding of inoperativeness means that the claimed invention is not supported by a
credible utility. Id. at 1356; see also U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, REVISED INTERIM
UTILITY GUIDELINES TRAINING MATERIALS 11 (1999), available at http://www.uspto.gov/webl
offices/pac/utility/utilityguide.pdf ("[A] utility that is inoperative is not credible."); id. at 5 ("A
credible utility is assessed from the standpoint of whether a [PHOSITA] would accept that the
recited or disclosed invention is currently available for such use."). For a discussion of the other
facets of the § 101 utility requirement, see discussion infra note 43.
11. See infra Part II.B.1.
12. See infra Part II.B.2.

13. In re Ferens, 417 F.2d 1072, 1074 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
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§ 101 analysis. This enablement-based approach would eliminate the
need for the § 101 operability requirement. It would also streamline
patent examination, improve patent quality, yield more technically
robust patents, and ultimately foster innovation.
The issue addressed in this Article-how to deal with
seemingly impossible inventions-has received almost no attention in
the academic literature. 14 This Article fills a gap in patent scholarship
and will contribute to ongoing debates over patent reform. It is part of
a larger project to resolve the disconnect between patent law and the
15
norms of science.
The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows. Part I
introduces impossibility from a scientific perspective and divides
seemingly impossible quests into three broad categories. Part II
addresses how the patent system currently handles seemingly
impossible inventions. This Part takes issue with the subjective
nature of the inquiry and explores its ill-effects on innovation. It
concludes that the current regime leads to credibility lags, which
prevent the patent system from sitting at the cutting edge of science
and technology. To solve this problem, Part III offers an enablementbased approach for handling seemingly impossible inventions. This
approach replaces the currently employed, subjective credibility
assessment under § 101 with an objective, fact-intensive analytical
framework. This Part concludes by exploring the policy trade-offs in
adopting the new framework and explains how it fulfills several broad
goals of the patent system.

14. This is the first article to comprehensively explore incredible inventions and to seriously
challenge operability as a patentability requirement. Only a few articles have previously
explored operability. See generally Robert Ederer, On Operabilityas an Aspect of Patent Law, 42
J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 398 (1960); Daniel C. Rislove, Comment, A Case Study of Inoperable
Inventions: Why is the USPTO PatentingPseudoscience?,2006 Wis. L. REV. 1275 (2006).
15. See generally Sean B. Seymore, Heightened Enablement in the Unpredictable Arts, 56
UCLA L. REV. 127 (2008) [hereinafter Seymore, Heightened Enablement] (proposing a new
approach for examining patent applications in unpredictable technologies which, by requiring
applicants to disclose actual experimental results, resolves a striking incongruity between patent
law and the experimental sciences); Sean B. Seymore, Rethinking Novelty in Patent Law, 60
DUKE L.J. 919 (2011) [hereinafter Seymore, Rethinking Novelty] (arguing that current novelty
doctrine can produce paradoxical outcomes for complex inventions and is seemingly incongruous
with basic principles of patent law); Sean B. Seymore, Serendipity, 88 N.C. L. REV. 185 (2009)
(arguing that although accidental discoveries pervade science, inventors who invent by accident
can be unjustly deprived of patents because such discoveries do not mesh with the substantive
law of invention); Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
621 (2010) [hereinafter Seymore, Teaching Function] (proposing a disclosure regime that would
allow patents to compete with other forms of technical literature as a source of substantive

technical information).
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I. ACHIEVING THE IMPOSSIBLE
A. Impossibility as a Driving Force
The quest to achieve the impossible is a strong driving force in
scientific research. 16 Scientists who succeed in doing so are unique
because they recognize nature's complexity, know what is happening
at the forefront of theory and experiment, and are "capable of selecting
the new tools that make it possible to achieve today what was
impossible yesterday and that will be powerful but routine
tomorrow." 17 But the path to success is not always smoothly paved-it
is often rife with skepticism ("It'll never work!') or disparagement
("You're an idiot!') from the scientific community.18 Aside from
vindication, 19 success spawns new fields of inquiry, 20 illuminates old
ones, 21 promotes scientific progress, 22 and extends the frontiers of
23
knowledge.
16. "Scientists like to show that things widely held to be impossible are in fact entirely
possible...." JOHN D. BARROW, IMPOSSIBILITY, at vii (1998). For instance, K. C. Nicolaou-a
prolific organic chemist who is the author or coauthor of over 700 scientific publications and an
inventor on more than 60 patents-admits that his favorite synthetic targets are ones that 'look
impossible at first glance" and "provide an opportunity to discover or invent new science." 2005
ACS NationalAward Winners, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS, Feb. 14, 2005, at 60-61.

17. Gustaf Arrhenius, Presentation of the Roebling Medal of the Mineralogical Society of
America for 1976 to Carl W. Correns, 62 AM. MINERALOGIST 603, 603 (1977).
18. This has even been the case for many Nobel Prize-winning achievements. For instance,
Barbara McClintock, recipient of the 1971 National Medal of Science and the 1983 Nobel Prize in
Physiology or Medicine for her pioneering work in cytogenetics, recounted that "[fellow
scientists] called me crazy, absolutely mad at times." Jumping Genes, TIME, Nov. 30, 1981, at
106. Although McClintock published her findings in 1951, it took the scientific community over
thirty years to overcome its skepticism because "the prevailing wisdom was that genetic
structure was stable and immutable." Id.
19. Perhaps the best evidence of vindication is the numerous reports in technical journals of
results long considered unachievable. A good example is K. C. Nicolaou's total synthesis of the
top-selling anticancer drug Taxol. See K. C. Nicolaou et al., Total Synthesis of Taxol, 367 NATURE
630, 630-34 (1994). This achievement, "considered as the 'holy grail' of synthesis in the late
1980s and early 1990s ... stands as the quintessential symbol of all natural products molecular
complexity, and... [is] the single most important milestone of complex molecular construction in
recent decades." Cover Legend [K. C. Nicolaou], 34 INT'L J. ONCOLOGY 299, 300 (2009).
20. The most striking example is the field of organic chemistry, which became an area of
systematic study in 1828 only after Friedrich Wohler accidentally synthesized urea from mixing
two inorganic salts. See Friedrich Whiler, Ueber kiinstliche Bildung des Harnstoffs [On the
Artificial Formationof Urea], 88 ANNALEN DER PHYSIK UND CHEMIE 253, 253-56 (1828); see also
AARON J. IHDE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN CHEMISTRY 163-65 (1964) (presenting a
historical account). This event, heralded as the first organic synthesis, shattered the prevailing
belief that man could never make any substance extracted from living things. See id. at 163-64
(discussing vitalism).
21. For example, chemists long believed that it was impossible for carbon to form fewer
than four bonds when it occurred in an organic compound. See, e.g., AUGUST BERNTHSEN, A
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B. Types of Impossibility
It is possible to divide seemingly impossible quests into three
broad categories. 24 The first category, Type I impossibilities,
encompasses quests where the hoped-for result is per se impossible
because the methodology conflicts with known scientific principles or
basic laws of nature. Type I impossibilities are easy to identify because
"[the incontrovertible evidence that Nature is governed by reliable
25
'laws' allows us to separate the possible from the [truly] impossible.
Perhaps the best example is alchemy, which is loosely defined as the
quest to transform a cheap metal like lead into gold. 26 One reason why
researchers proceed down dead-end paths is because they
misunderstand the underlying science. Were a Type I impossibility
ever to become possible, "[it] would represent a fundamental shift in
our understanding of [science]."27

TEXTBOOK OF ORGANIC CHEMISTRY 14-16 (George M'Gowan trans., 1891) (describing carbon's
bonding tendencies). In 1900, a chemistry professor at the University of Michigan published a
paper describing an organic molecule in which carbon only formed three bonds. See generally
Moses Gomberg, An Instance of Trivalent Carbon: Triphenylmethyl, 22 J. AM. CHEMICAL SOC'Y
757 (1900). The chemistry community did not accept Gomberg's explanation for his result until
decades later. See Aaron J. Ihde, The History of Free Radicals and Moses Gomberg's
Contributions, 15 PURE & APPLIED CHEMISTRY 1, 9-14 (1967). Gomberg's work shed new light on
chemical bonding and led scientists to realize that free radicals play a large role in natural
phenomena. See generally BARRY HALLIWELL & JOHN M. C. GUTTERIDGE, FREE RADICALS IN
BIOLOGY AND MEDICINE (3d ed. 1999).
22. Scientific progress is "the cumulative growth of a system of knowledge over time, in
which useful features are retained and nonuseful features are abandoned, based on the rejection
or confirmation of testable knowledge." MICHAEL SHERMER, WHY PEOPLE BELIEVE WEIRD THINGS
31 (2002).
23. As discussed below, the patent system seeks similar ends. See infra Part III.D.2.
24. These categories are somewhat similar to those used by others. See, e.g., In re
Chilowsky, 229 F.2d 457, 462 (C.C.P.A. 1956) (articulating three categories of inoperable
inventions); MICHIO KAKU, PHYSICS OF THE IMPOSSIBLE, at xvii (First Anchor Books 2009)
(dividing impossibilities into three broad categories).
25. BARROW, supra note 16, at vii.
26. See 1 J. W. MELLOR, A COMPREHENSIVE TREATISE ON INORGANIC AND THEORETICAL
CHEMISTRY § 12 (1922) (exploring the history of alchemy). Alchemists believed that "just as the
hardness, colour, fusibility, and other properties of certain metals can be altered, so must it be
possible to change all the properties of one metal into those of another, and thus produce a
veritable transmutation." Id. As scientists began to understand nuclear physics, they learned
how to transform one element into another with radioactivity. For a description of the first
artificial atomic transmutation, see BERNARD JAFFE, CRUCIBLES: THE STORY OF CHEMISTRY FROM
ANCIENT ALCHEMY TO NUCLEAR FISSION 214 (4th ed. 1976) (describing Nobel Laureate Ernest
Rutherford's conversion of nitrogen to oxygen in 1919).
27. KAKU, supranote 24, at xvii.

1498

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:5:1491

Type I1 impossibilities are pseudoscience, 2 quests that appear
scientific but lack scientific foundation.29 A good example is the claim
that an electrified cage can enhance the extrasensory perception
("ESP")3 ° of a human subject placed inside of it.31 Pseudoscience's
identifying characteristics include widespread skepticism, 32 the
inability of others to reproduce the research claim, 33 static or
randomly changing ideas, 34 the lack of connectivity with other
scientific disciplines, 35 and a lack of publications in the mainstream
36
peer-reviewed literature.

28. Alternative coinages include "junk science" and "pathological science." BRIAN
STABLEFORD, SCIENCE FACT AND SCIENCE FICTION 410 (2006).
29. GILA GAT-TILMAN, SCIENCE, PSEUDOSCIENCE, AND MORAL VALUES 20 (2007); see also
SHERMER, supra note 22, at 33 (defining pseudoscience as "claims presented so that they appear
scientific even though they lack supporting evidence and plausibility"). Commentators differ in
their views on the impact of pseudoscience on scientific progress. Compare JOHN GRANT,
DISCARDED SCIENCE 9 (2006) (arguing that pseudoscience does not help and often impedes the
advance of human knowledge), with RIKi G. A. DOLBY, UNCERTAIN KNOWLEDGE 207 (2002)
(noting that chemistry and astronomy have pseudoscientific origins, and that Darwin's theory of
evolution morphed from pseudoscience to orthodoxy).
30. Extrasensory perception, the "sixth sense," is an awareness beyond the ordinary senses
of hearing, sight, smell, taste, and touch. LYNNE KELLY, THE SKEPTIC'S GUIDE TO THE
PARANORMAL 125 (Thunder's Mouth Press 2004).
31. See ANDRIJA PUHARICH, BEYOND TELEPATHY 211-25 (1973) (describing the construction
and operation of the cage and its effect on ESP); Andrija Puharich, ElectricalField Reinforcement
of ESP, 9 INT'L J. PARAPSYCHOL. 175, 175-83 (1967) (discussing general principles). Puharich
tried to patent his device. See Puharich v. Brenner, 415 F.2d 979, 981-83 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
(affirming the PTO's rejection). Aside from doubting the results of the electrified cage
experiments, most scientists remain skeptical about ESP. See infra note 32.
32. See, e.g., BARRY H. KANTOWITZ ET AL., EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 15 (9th ed. 2008)
("ESP cannot be evaluatedo because only believers can be present when it is demonstrated. The
scientist takes a dim view of this logic and most scientists, especially psychologists, are skeptical
about ESP.").
33. See SCOTT 0. LILIENFELD ET AL., SCIENCE AND PSEUDOSCIENCE IN CLINICAL
PSYCHOLOGY 8 (2004) (contending that pseudoscientists over-rely on anecdotal evidence, which is
insufficient to justify a claim and is rarely dispositive); ADIL E. SHAMOO & DAVID B. RESNIK,
RESPONSIBLE CONDUCT OF RESEARCH 51 (2d ed. 2009) ('The ability of other investigators to
replicate the experiments by following the method in the published report is crucial to the
advancement of science.").
34. Unlike real science, where old ideas and knowledge evolve in light of new discoveries or
growth in understanding, in pseudoscience ideas do not progress because there is no anchor in an
established, foundational body of knowledge. GREGORY N. DERRY, WHAT SCIENCE IS AND How IT
WORKS 159 (1999). Thus, ideas remain static because there is no reason to accept one idea over
another. Id.
35. Given that pseudoscientists often purport to create new frameworks rather than build
on existing ones, "they neglect well-established scientific principles or hard-won scientific
knowledge." LILIENFELD ET AL., supra note 33, at 7. For this reason, mainstream science "must
insist on very high standards of evidence before [accepting the claim]." Id. at 8.
36. Peer review refers to the screening of research results by colleagues in a particular
discipline. Peter Hernon & Candy Schwartz, Peer Review Revisited, 28 LIBR. & INFO. SCI. RES. 1,
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Finally, Type III impossibilities include quests that are
technically impossible right now but might become possible at some
point in the future. 37 A good example is a technique that would allow
adults to regrow decayed, worn, or lost teeth. 38 In these quests, there
is something that makes the impossible seem possible. This something
could range from a promising preliminary research result to a
39
widespread positive vibe about the discipline.
These categories are important because it may be that the PTO
and the courts are too quick to deem something as per se impossible
(Type 1) or pseudoscientific (Type II) when it is, in fact, possible now or
will be at some not-too-distant point in the future (Type II).40 When
this miscategorization happens, it can result in delayed entry-or
perhaps no entry at all-of inventions with true technical merit into
the patent system.

1 (2006). Pseudoscientists may evade peer review because they fear that the process is inherently
biased against their claims (particularly if it conflicts with well-established paradigms) or if their
research methodologies do not conform to the scientific method. LILIENFELD ET AL., supra note
33, at 6.
37. Cf. KAKU, supra note 24, at xvii (defining "Class I" impossibilities as those which are
impossible today but may become possible in the future because they do not violate the laws of
physics).
38. See, e.g., Kazuhisa Nakao et al., The Development of a Bioengineered Organ Germ
Methods, 4 NATURE METHODS 227, 227-30 (2007) (describing a technique where researchers
grew a budding tooth in a Petri dish and then transplanted it into the an empty cavity in a
mouse's mouth, where it grew to full size); Zunyi Zhang et al., Antagonistic Actions of Msxl and
Osr2 Pattern Mammalian Teeth into a Single Row, 323 SCIENCE 1232, 1232-34 (2009) (reporting
that deleting a specific gene in mice led them to grow extra teeth). Both groups believe that their
findings will help elucidate how nature makes teeth and, eventually, lead to tooth regeneration
in humans.
39. Nanotechnology is an excellent example. It is a field of applied science based on the
fabrication, control, and manipulation of materials on the atomic or molecular scale (one
billionth of a meter). CHARLES P. POOLE, JR. & FRANK J. OWENS, INTRODUCTION TO
NANOTECHNOLOGY 1 (2003). In a famous speech that he delivered to the American Physical
Society over five decades ago, Nobel Laureate Richard Feynman predicted that one day scientists
would be able to manipulate matter on the atomic or molecular scale. See generally Richard
Feynman, There's Plenty of Room at the Bottom (Dec. 29, 1959), in THE PLEASURE OF FINDING
THINGS OUT 117 (Jeffrey Robbins ed., 2000). It now appears that nanotechnology has endless
possibilities, including nanoscale drug delivery
systems, nanosurgery, nanorobots,
nanomachines, and nanoelectronics. See generally FRITZ ALLHOFF ET AL., WHAT IS
NANOTECHNOLOGY AND WHY DOES IT MATTER? (2010). The federal government spent nearly $1.5
billion on nanotechnology research in 2009, which is up from $464 million in 2001. See NNI
Budget, NAT'L NANOTECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE, http://nano.gov/about.nni/what/funding (last
visited Oct. 11, 2011).
40. It is important to emphasize that the category depends on the invention, not the
problem to be solved. For instance, an invention claiming a method of using milk to whiten skin
might be pseudoscientific (a Type II impossibility; discussed infra notes 137-139); however, skin
whitening is a problem that science can solve.
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II. PATENTING THE IMPOSSIBLE
A. The OperabilityRequirement
The patent system and mainstream science both rely on the
dissemination of technical information to promote innovation. 41 And
like mainstream science, the patent system relies on credibility
assessments. It seeks to derail inventions that are so speculative or
esoteric in nature that operativeness appears unlikely because a
PHOSITA would consider the applicant's assertions unbelievable,
incredible in light of contemporary knowledge, or factually
misleading. 42 Presently the patent system relies on § 101 to perform
this gatekeeping function. 43 Specifically, the courts interpret the
utility requirement of § 101 to mandate that an invention operate to
44
produce the intended result.
1. The Examination Rubric
The PTO undertakes a two-step analysis to gauge operability.
First, the examiner construes the relevant claims to precisely define

41. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) (explaining that the
information disclosed in the patent adds to the public storehouse of knowledge); Brenner v.
Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 533 (1966) ("It is true, of course, that one of the purposes of the patent
system is to encourage dissemination of information concerning discoveries and inventions.");
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) (describing a patent as "an inducement, to bring
forth new knowledge").
42. In re Gazave, 379 F.2d 973, 978 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
43. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. In addition to operability (or "credible" utility),
the utility requirement of § 101 has two other parts. See generally U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001) (discussing substantial,
specific, and credible utility), cited with approval in In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir.
2005). Substantial utility requires that the invention "provide a significant and presently
available benefit to the public." Id. at 1371. Specific utility requires that the invention provide "a
well-defined and particular benefit to the public." Id. Together, these requirements preclude from
patentability "mere ideas[,] . . . 'hypothetical possibilities, [and] objectives which the claimed
[inventions] .. .could possibly achieve." In re 318 Patent Infringement Litig., 583 F.3d 1317,
1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Fisher,421 F.2d at 1373)).
44. Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The
operability requirement can be traced back to the nineteenth century. See Mitchell v. Tilghman,
86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 287, 396 (1873) (holding that a patentable invention must be "capable of being
used to effect the object proposed"). The utility requirement itself "has its origin in [the
Intellectual Property Clause ofl the Constitution, which indicates that the purpose of
empowering Congress to authorize the granting of patents is "to promote the progress
of... useful arts." Stiftung v. Reinshaw PLC, 945 F.2d 1173, 1180 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (quoting U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
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the invention to be tested for compliance with § 101. 45 Second, if it
appears that the invention cannot operate to produce the intended
result, the examiner assesses credibility by asking if a PHOSITA
would believe what the applicant asserts in the written description of
the invention. 46 If the examiner determines that a PHOSITA would
reasonably doubt the applicant's assertions, then the invention is
1 for
unpatentable under § 101 for lack of utility and under § 112
4 7 This dual rejection makes sense because an
lack of enablement.
applicant cannot possibly enable a PHOSITA to practice 48 an
49
invention that does not work.
A rejection triggers an evidentiary burden-shifting process.
Initially the applicant's disclosure enjoys a presumption of truth; the
examiner must presume that the invention can operate to produce the
intended result. 50 This means that the examiner must establish a
45. Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 956 (Fed. Cir. 1983). During examination
the examiner must give claim terms their broadest reasonable interpretation as they would be
understood by a PHOSITA yet consistent with the applicant's disclosure. In re Morris, 127 F.3d
1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
46. In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The written description is the part of
the patent (or patent application) that completely describes the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
47.

See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE,

§ 2107.01 (8th ed. 8th rev. 2010) [hereinafter MPEP] (discussing the dual rejection). Enablement
is one of the three disclosure requirements appearing in 35 U.S.C. § 112 1:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms
as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most
nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) 1 (emphasis added). Enablement is discussed infra Part III.A.
48. The courts often use the term "practice" when referring to the how-to-make and how-touse prongs of the enablement requirement of § 112 1. Compare Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v.
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 326 F.3d 1226, 1234 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("The legal question of
enablement involves an assessment of whether a patent disclosure would have enabled [a
PHOSITA] at the time the application was filed to make and use the claimed invention without
undue experimentation."), with In re Swartz, 232 F.3d 862, 863 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (per curiam) ('To
1, a patent application must adequately disclose
satisfy the enablement requirement of § 112
the claimed invention so as to enable a [PHOSITA] to practice the invention at the time the
application was filed without undue experimentation.").
49. See Process Control, 190 F.3d at 1358 ("If a patent claim fails to meet the utility
requirement because it is [inoperative], then it also fails to meet the how-to-use aspect of the
enablement requirement."); In re Ziegler, 992 F.2d 1197, 1200-01 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("The how-toIf the
use prong of § 112 incorporates as a matter of law the requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 101 ....
application fails as a matter of fact to satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 101, then the application also fails as a
matter of law to enable one of ordinary skill in the art to use the invention under 35 U.S.C. §
112." (internal citations omitted)).
50. In re Cortright, 165 F.3d 1353, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also MPEP, supra note 47,
§ 2107.02 (instructing examiners not to begin the analysis by assuming that the asserted utility
is false). The underpinnings of the presumption trace back to a C.C.P.A. case:

1502

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:5:1491

prima facie case of unpatentability by coming forward with factual
evidence of noncredibility. 51 Evidentiary sources may include peerreviewed
materials,
non-peer-reviewed
materials,
anecdotal
information, information from related technologies, and logic. 5 2 If the
examiner cannot adduce the evidence, then the PTO must issue a
patent if the applicant meets the other requirements for
53
patentability.
An applicant faced with an inoperability rejection can either
attack or rebut the examiner's prima facie case. An applicant can
successfully attack it if the examiner produces no (or insufficient)
evidence to support a finding of inoperability. 54 A good example is
when the examiner relies on common knowledge in the field as proof
that the invention cannot work. 55 The applicant can also mount a
successful attack if the examiner compels the inventor to explain
precisely how or why an invention works 56 or contends that the
As a matter of Patent Office practice, a [written description] which contains a disclosure
of utility which corresponds in scope to the subject matter sought to be patented must be
taken as sufficient to satisfy the utility requirement of § 101 for the entire claimed
subject matter unless there is a reason for [a PHOSITA] to question the objective truth
of the statement of utility or its scope.
In re Langer, 503 F.2d 1380, 1391 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (emphasis added).
51. In re Gaubert, 524 F.2d 1222, 1224-25 (C.C.P.A. 1975); see also In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d
1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (explaining that the examiner bears the initial burden of presenting
a prima facie case of unpatentability); Fregeau v. Mossinghoff, 776 F.2d 1034, 1038 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (applying the prima facie case to § 101).
52. In re Dash, 118 F. App'x 488, 491 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The nature of the source "merely
go[es] to the weight of the evidence, not whether it can be relied upon at all." Id.
53. Oetiker, 977 F.2d at 1445. The other patentability requirements appear supranote 7.
54. See supra note 51 and accompanying text; see also MPEP, supra note 47, § 2107.02
(encouraging examiners to provide documentary evidence whenever possible).
55. The general rule is that the PTO "may take notice of facts beyond the record
which ... are capable of such instant and unquestionable demonstration as to defy dispute." In
re Ahlert, 424 F.2d 1088, 1091 (C.C.P.A. 1970). But there are limits. First, as to core factual
findings, the PTO "cannot simply reach conclusions based on its own understanding or
experience-or on its assessment of what would be basic knowledge or common sense." In re
Zurko, 258 F.3d 1379, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2001). For such facts, the PTO should point to concrete
evidence in the record to support the rejection. Id. Second, if the examiner relies on common
knowledge without documentary support, the rejection can survive only if it is based on sound
technical reasoning and the applicant does not demand that the examiner provide authority for
the statement. In re Chevenard, 139 F.2d 711, 713 (C.C.P.A. 1943). Third, the PTO must give the
applicant an opportunity to challenge a fact asserted to be common knowledge. Id. But see KSR
Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (explaining that in the nonobviousness context,
reliance on common sense, viewed through PHOSITA's perspective, is appropriate).
56. See Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consol. Rubber Tire Co., 220 U.S. 428, 435-36 (1911)
(explaining that an inventor need not understand the scientific principles underlying the
invention); Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("[It is not a requirement of
patentability that an inventor correctly set forth, or even know, how or why the invention works.
. ."); In re Newman,
.
782 F.2d 971, 974 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (explaining that the PTO should not ask
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invention is partially operable, 57 performs crudely, 58 or is inferior to
others. 59 Reliance on any of these rationales, whether alone or in
60
combination, is insufficient to establish the PTO's initial burden.
An alternative strategy is to concede the prima facie case and
rebut it. The burden shifts to the applicant to come forward with
persuasive arguments or additional evidence sufficient to convince a
PHOSITA to accept the applicant's assertions. 6 1 Applicants can rely on
affidavits as proof of operability, although those from experts in the
field that show a nexus between the intended result and the
supporting evidence are the most probative. 62 When the applicant

applicants for scientific explanations because the agency "is not a guarantor of scientific theory");
In re Libby, 255 F.2d 412, 415 (C.C.P.A. 1958) (explaining that enablement does not require an
understanding of the underlying science).
57. "The threshold [for] utility is not high." Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d
1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also Testimony of Scott A. Chambers, former Assoc. Solicitor of
the PTO, Federal Trade Commission Hearings on Competition and Intellectual Property Law
and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy 95-96 (Feb. 8, 2002), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellectI020208intelpropertytrans.pdf
(noting that the credibility
standard of § 101 only requires that the invention be "plausible" to a PHOSITA). An invention is
inoperable only if it is "totally incapable of achieving a useful result." Brooktree Corp. v.
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Thus, an applicant satisfies
§ 101 as long as the invention accomplishes at least one stated objective. Raytheon Co. v. Roper
Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 958 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
58. Hildreth v. Mastoras, 257 U.S. 27, 34 (1921) ("The machine patented may be imperfect
in its operation; but if it embodies the generic principle[] and works ... though only in a crude
way... it is enough."); see also Nat'l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166
F.3d 1190, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (explaining that operability still exists even if the invention does
not work perfectly under all conditions).
59. See Stiftung v. Reinshaw PLC, 945 F.2d 1173, 1180 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("An invention need
not be the best or the only way to accomplish a certain result, and it need only be useful to some
extent and in certain applications ....");Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., 807
F.2d 955, 960 n.12 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("It is possible for an invention to be less effective than
existing devices but nevertheless meet the statutory requirements for patentability."); In re
Ratti, 270 F.2d 810, 814 (C.C.P.A. 1959) (rejecting the PTO's contention that an invention
"[must] possess some definite advantage over the prior art" in order to be patentable).
60. If the examiner does not meet this initial burden, the applicant does not need to provide
any additional evidence to substantiate its assertions, which are presumptively correct. In re
Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
61. In re Swartz, 232 F.3d 862, 864 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Brana, 51 F.3d at 1566); see also
In re Ferens, 417 F.2d 1072, 1074 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (explaining that an examiner may request
evidence to substantiate the applicant's assertions when they appear to be incredible in light of
contemporary knowledge). But see In re Novak, 306 F.2d 924, 928 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (noting that
rebuttal evidence is unnecessary if a PHOSITA would obviously accept the applicant's
allegations as true).
62. See In re Payne, 606 F.2d 303, 315 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (noting that facts set forth in an
affidavit from an expert in the field are highly probative); see also In re Perrigo, 48 F.2d 965, 966
(C.C.P.A. 1931) (determining that affidavits which were brief and general in character were
insufficient to prove operability). Regarding the nexus, the affiant must be able to show that the
intended result stems from the invention and not from some other source. See Ferens, 417 F.2d
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submits rebuttal evidence, the examiner must "start over" and
"consider all of the evidence anew."63 The examiner must determine
patentability based on the entire record, 64 with a preponderance of the
65
evidence as the standard of proof.
Whether an invention is operable under § 101 is a question of
fact.66 While the type and amount of proof required depends on the
nature of the invention, the degree of certainty necessary for both the
truth of the intended result and the ultimate fact of operativeness or
inoperativeness is the same in all cases. 67 An invention rejected for
inoperability under § 101 also faces rejection for lack of enablement
under § 112 1 because the applicant cannot teach a PHOSITA how
to use something that does not work. 68 Whether a disclosure is
enabling is a legal conclusion based on underlying factual inquiries. 69
On appeal, 70 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
at 1075 (finding that affidavits from lay persons attesting to a cure for hair loss were
unpersuasive because they evinced no understanding of the written description of the invention
and could not show a nexus); id. (rejecting an affidavit from a doctor who, though highly skilled,
was not an expert in the field and thus could not adequately set forth experimental observations
about the alleged cure for hair loss).
63. In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (internal citation omitted).
64. See MPEP, supra note 47, § 2107.02 (reminding examiners that incredible utility "is a
conclusion, not a starting point for analysis" under § 101).
65. In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
66. Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 956 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
67. In re Ferens, 417 F.2d 1072, 1075 (C.C.P.A. 1969); In re Chiowsky, 229 F.2d 457, 462
(C.C.P.A. 1956) (explaining that the patent statutes and case law lead to this rule). Regardless,
one commentator suggests that the applicant may face an insurmountable burden. See Edward
C. Walterscheid, Insufficient Disclosure Rejections (PartII), 62 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'y 229, 240-41
(1980) ("[A]n examiner has not only established a prima facie case of [inoperability] if he can
show that the alleged utility is at best highly speculative and at worst incredible, but has also
created an exceedingly difficult burden of proof for an applicant to overcome such a rejection.").
68. See cases cited supranotes 48-49 and accompanying text; see also In re Fisher, 421 F.3d
1365, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that since the Board's § 101 rejection was supported by
substantial evidence, the court would also leave the § 112 1 rejection undisturbed because the
applicant failed to satisfy the enablement requirement as a matter of law). It is worth noting
that an applicant can disclose an invention which satisfies the operability requirement of § 101
but fails to satisfy the enablement requirement of § 112. See Mowry v. Whitney, 81 U.S. (14
Wall.) 620, 644 (1871) ("[The claimed] process may have been a highly useful invention ... and
yet he may have failed so to describe it as to teach the [PHOSITA] how to practice it.").
69. In re Swartz, 232 F.3d 862, 863 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
70. An applicant whose claims have been twice rejected by the examiner can appeal to an
intraoffice tribunal known as the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences which, among other
things, reviews adverse decisions of examiners. 35 U.S.C. §§ 6(b), 134(a) (2006). The Board can
affirm a rejection or reverse and remand to the examining corps. 37 C.F.R. § 1.197 (2011). An
applicant dissatisfied with a Board decision can appeal to the Federal Circuit or file a civil action
against the Director in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. 35 U.S.C. §§ 141, 145.
In the latter, the parties may submit additional evidence or argue the previous evidence afresh.
Gould v. Quigg, 822 F.2d 1074, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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("Federal Circuit") reviews a finding of (in)operability and the factual
71
issues underlying enablement deferentially.
2. Proof
Gauging operability is easiest when the applicant can point to
actual experimental data or a working model to prove that the
invention works. 72 But unlike the rules of mainstream science, which
"require actual performance of every experimental detail" as a
prerequisite for publication, 73 in patent law an inventor only needs to
provide sufficient technical information to teach a PHOSITA how to
practice the invention without undue experimentation. 74 This means
that an applicant usually does not need to actually reduce an
invention to practice or produce a physical embodiment 75 of it in order
to obtain a patent.76 But even if an inventor does engage in some

71. As an initial matter, if the Board's (or trial court's) decision requires claim
interpretation, it is reviewed de novo. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (en banc); see also Raytheon Co., 724 F.2d at 956 ("In determining utility . . . the
claims must first be interpreted to define the invention to be tested for utility."). For appeals
from the PTO, the Federal Circuit reviews legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for
substantial evidence. In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Thus, the Board's
finding of inoperability as well as the facts underlying the enablement determination are
reviewed for substantial evidence, while the legal conclusion of enablement is reviewed de novo.
In re Swartz, 232 F.3d at 863 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Where operability is at issue in a jury trial, the
Federal Circuit determines if substantial evidence exists to support the verdict. Brooktree Corp.
v, Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1992). As for enablement, the
Federal Circuit reviews the trial court's legal conclusion de novo but reviews the underlying
factual findings for substantial evidence in jury trials, Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc.,
325 F.3d 1306, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2003), or clear error in bench trials. Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst
Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2003). While utility and enablement often
involve complex scientific principles, the Federal Circuit views them not as "legal abstractions,"
but as issues "[which] properly devolve on the trier of fact" who, as for other kinds of evidence,
"must make determinations of credibility, reliability, and weight." Brooktree, 977 F.2d at 1573.
72. Cf. Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 15, at 652-53 (advocating a working
example requirement for complex technologies which would, among other things, simplify the
enablement analysis).
73. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(Newman, J., dissenting).
74. Id.
75. An embodiment is a concrete form of an invention (like a chemical compound or a
widget) described in a patent application or patent. ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY,
PATENT LAW AND POLICY 27 (4th ed. 2007).
76. See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 60 (1998) (explaining that "the word
'invention' in the Patent Act unquestionably refers to the inventor's conception rather than to a
physical embodiment of that idea"). Thus, in patent law, an invention can be actually reduced to
practice by building a working model or constructively reduced to practice by filing a patent
application which describes how to make and use it. Univ. of Rochester v. G. D. Searle & Co., 358
F.3d 916, 926 (Fed. Cir. 2004). A constructive reduction to practice presumptively satisfies the
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prefiling experimentation, there are practical reasons why it might be
77
de minimis.
Thus, the key challenge for the PTO is gauging operability
without actual proof7 8 And since the PTO lacks an experimental
testing facility, it cannot easily probe the applicant's assertions. 79 A
PTO official explains the problem:
[T]o a large degree when the going gets tough, certainly the applicant is in the position
to have the experts to do the testing, to submit documentary evidence to show why the
examiner should allow the case. And, of course.... we don't have laboratories, and we
don't have independent experts in that regard. So therefore, we are really compelled to
accept some of8 0that, particularly from the standpoint of the fact finding, that is
presented to us.

Aside from cases involving perpetual motion machines, 8 1 where
there is a working model requirement,8 2 the PTO allows applicants to
1. Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d
disclosure requirements of § 112
1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
77. See infra Part III.D.1.
78. See Arthur Kantrowitz, Proposal for an Institution for Scientific Judgment, 156
SCIENCE 763, 764 (1967) ("It is actually very difficult to offer rigorous proof that something
cannot be done .. ");Edward C. Walterscheid, Insufficient Disclosure Rejections (Part1), 62 J.
PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 217, 220 (1980) (explaining that obtaining proof can be a major problem for
examiners, particularly since they must provide reasons and/or evidence to establish a prima
facie case of unpatentability).
79. See, e.g., Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Chemtronics, Inc., 439 F.2d 1369, 1379 (5th Cir.
1970) (noting that in the absence of its own testing facilities, the PTO must rely on information
presented to it); FED. TRADE COMM'N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 5, at 9 (2003) [hereinafter FTC Report] ('Yet the
PTO lacks testing facilities, and assertions that cannot be overcome by documentary evidence
promptly identifiable by the examiner often must be accepted."). Curiously, the Patent Act of
1836, ch. 356, § 6, 5 Stat. 117 (amended 1839), required applicants to submit models at the time
of filing. See In re Breslow, 616 F.2d 516, 522 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (recounting the history of the
requirement); Kendall J. Dood, Patent Models and the Patent Law: 1790-1880 (Part1), 65 J. PAT.
OFF. SOC'Y 187 (1983) (same). The Patent Act of 1870 made the submission of models
discretionary. See Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, §§ 28-29, 16 Stat. 198; Breslow, 616 F.2d at 522.
The Patent Act of 1952 preserved the ancient authority in its then-existing form. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 114 (discussed infra note 82); Breslow, 616 F.2d at 522 (explaining that Congress had little
interest in the statute).
80. FTC Report, supra note 79, ch. 5, at 9 (quoting Stephen G. Kunin, former Deputy
Commissioner for Patent Examination Policy at the PTO).
81. For an explanation of perpetual motion, see supranote 4.
82. The patent statute permits the examiner to request a working model of an invention.
See 35 U.S.C. § 114 ("The Director may require the applicant to furnish a model of convenient
size to exhibit advantageously the several parts of his invention."). However, the PTO rarely
invokes the requirement unless the invention involves perpetual motion. See MPEP, supra note
47, § 608.03 (noting the exception). The exception likely stems from Joseph Newman's fight in
the PTO and the courts over the application he filed in 1979 for an "Energy Generation System
Having Higher Energy Output than Input." See Newman v. Quigg, 681 F. Supp. 16, 16-17
(D.D.C. 1988) (presenting a chronology). After the PTO rejected the perpetual motion machine as
inoperable under § 101, Newman sued the Director in district court, which ultimately remanded
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choose their own way of establishing operability when the examiner

questions

8 3

it.

B. Problems
1. The Subjective Credibility Assessment
The test for operability is whether a PHOSITA has reason to
doubt the objective truth of the applicant's assertions.8 4 The PTO can
establish reasonable doubt if the applicant's assertions "suggest an
inherently unbelievable undertaking,"8 5 "involve implausible scientific
principles," 8 6 "run[] counter to what would be believed would happen
by the [PHOSITA],"8 7 or emerge from fields ridden with fraud or from
which "little of a successful nature has been developed."8 In each
situation the examiner must turn to mainstream science to determine
if the applicant's assertions are (in)credible in light of contemporary
knowledge in the field.8 9 Thus, credibility in mainstream science and
operability in patent law are tightly linked. But, in light of certain
idiosyncrasies in mainstream science set forth below, one might ask if
this should be the case.
the application for a new examination. See In re Newman, 782 F.2d 971, 972 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(summarizing the procedural history). This time the examiner ordered Newman to deliver a
working model of his 9,000-pound machine to the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) for
testing. Id. at 973-74; I. Peterson, A Patent Pursuit:Joe Newman's "Energy Machine," 22 Sci.
NEWS 342, 342 (1985). On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that while the NBS could not
dismantle the device to elucidate how it works, the agency could test it to see if it works.
Newman, 782 F.2d at 974; accord In re Aufhauser, 399 F.2d 275, 283 (C.C.P.A. 1968). The NBS
determined that the device could not produce the intended result, which led the PTO to again
reject the application. See ROBERT E. HEBNER ET AL., REPORT OF TESTS ON JOSEPH NEWMAN'S
DEVICE, NBSIR 86-3405, at 24 (1986) ("[I]n no case did the device's efficiency approach 100
percent."); see also Newman, 681 F. Supp. at 19-23 (describing the tests). The district court
agreed with the PTO, id. at 23-24, as did the Federal Circuit. Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575,
1582 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Interestingly, some scientists argue that perpetual motion is not
necessarily impossible; rather, it just does not fit within the present framework of
thermodynamics. See, e.g., DOLBY, supra note 29, at 75 (exploring plausible scientific theories
which are consistent with perpetual motion).
83. MPEP, supranote 47, § 608.03.
84. See supranotes 10, 47 and accompanying text.
85. In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing In re Jolles, 628 F.2d 1322, 1327
(C.C.P.A. 1980) (reversing the PTO's denial of a patent for chemotherapy drugs because the
applicant's assertions that they effectively put a particular type of leukemia in remission were no
longer incredible)).
86. Id.
87. In re Pottier, 376 F.2d 328, 330 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
88. In re Gazave, 379 F.2d 973, 978 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (quoting In re Oberweger, 115 F.2d 826,
827 (C.C.P.A. 1940) (concluding that treating baldness is impossible)).
89. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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a. Scientific Gatekeeping
In its efforts to advance scientific knowledge and maintain
communal standards, mainstream science seeks to discourage Type I
and Type 11 quests 90 while fostering those in Type 111.91 It does so by
assessing credibility, which is the degree of belief scientists attach to a
research claim and to the facts presented to support it.92
The process begins when a researcher formally presents a
claim to the scientific community by submitting a manuscript to a
journal for publication. 93 At this point, a legitimization mechanism
kicks in, with the built-in "knowledge filter" known as peer review at
its core 94 and with the journal editors and reviewers as the
gatekeepers. 95 Their mission is "[t]o promote original ideas, valuable
96
approaches, or new methods[,] and to reject the mediocre ones."
The gatekeepers fulfill this task by engaging in "organized
skepticism" to ensure that each research claim is reproducible, logical,
and independent and that it satisfies other basic conditions for
communal acceptability. 97 As Professor Gregory Derry explains:
90. See JOHN ZIMAN, RELIABLE KNOWLEDGE 132 (1991) C'In order . . . [to] retain its
reliability and credibility, each scientist ... [must] exercise critical vigilance over his own work
and the claims of his contemporaries."). This is not always an easy task. For example, consider
cold fusion discussed supra note 5. While some scientists believe that it is impossible (first
category) or pseudoscientific (second category), a growing number are optimistic and believe that
it might be possible in a few decades (third category).
91. Of course, this will depend on how "incredible" the quest appears at a particular
moment in time. For example, initially the scientific community may reject the quest as truly
impossible (Type 1) or pseudoscientific (Type 11). But a promising preliminary research result will
shift the quest to Type III. See discussion supraPart I.B (discussing Type III impossibilities).
92. JOHN ZIMAN, REAL SCIENCE 222 (2002).
93. DERRY, supra note 34, at 161; see also DARYL E. CHUBIN & EDWARD J. HACKETT,
PEERLESS SCIENCE: PEER REVIEW AND U.S. SCIENCE POLICY 85 (1990) (explaining that
publishing in journals replaced haphazard modes of circulating science and "facilitate[s]
communication, allocation of credit, and authentication of research results").
94. HENRY H. BAUER, SCIENTIFIC LITERACY AND THE MYTH OF THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD 4448 (1992). The mechanics of peer review typically works as follows. First, the researcher submits
the work to a journal. Second, the editor sends it to one or more reviewers knowledgeable about
the problem to judge its merit (uniqueness, methodology, adequacy of research design, and
potential contribution to the field). Third, the editor makes a final publication decision. Hernon
& Schwartz, supranote 36, at 1.
95. FREDERICK GRINNELL, EVERYDAY PRACTICE OF SCIENCE 75 (2009) (explaining how a
scientist with a new research claim must "get by the gatekeepers').
96. Juan Miguel Campanario, Have Referees Rejected Some of the Most-Cited Articles of All
Times?, 47 J. AM. SOC'Y INFO. SCI. 302, 302 (1996).
97. ZIMAN, supra note 92, at 246; see also MARK ERICKSON, SCIENCE, CULTURE AND SOCIETY
44 (2005) (explaining that a journal's imprimatur validates the research claim and ascribes
status to it). Although personal trust is very important in science, scientific communities "do not
accept research claims on the mere say-so of their authors." ZIMAN, supra note 92, at 246.
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[A new research claim] must undergo peer review, which means that it's sent to other
scientists for criticism and judgment; only work judged as worthwhile will be published.
The norm in science is to subject [research results] to criticism in order to weed out
bogus results. The results that survive this process become a well-established consensus,
and new results that contradict this consensus are greeted by particularly severe
skepticism. [But] even the consensus remains subject to criticism, and that criticism
becomes severe if new and contradictory results (having survived their own skeptical
open the possibility of
scrutiny) start to accumulate. Oddly enough, skepticism keeps
98
change even as it tends ... to foster conservatism in science.

Many would agree that the active, systematic exercise of
skepticism through peer review facilitates open communication and
the interchange of ideas, and this skepticism is largely responsible for
the success of contemporary science. 99 Indeed, peer review "pervades
science from beginning to end,"10 0 influencing not just publishing but
also what constitutes common knowledge and what scientists
ultimately view as logical.10 1
b. Credibility Lags in Mainstream Science
Peer review, however, has serious drawbacks that can affect
patent law. 10 2 Perhaps the major drawback is that the peer-review
10 3
process can delay, hinder, or block the dissemination of novel ideas.
There are several reasons why this is so. First, quantitative studies
and anecdotal sources reveal that reviewers resist change. 10 4 They will
98. DERRY, supra note 34, at 161.
99. ELIEZER GEISLER, THE METRICS OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 233 (2000).
100. Alister Scott, Peer Review and the Relevance of Science, 39 FUTURES 827, 828 (2007)
(citation omitted).
101. See GEISLER, supranote 99, at 233; sources cited supranotes 90-94.
102. Peer review has also been the subject of considerable criticism from those within and
outside of mainstream science. See, e.g., Campanario, supra note 96, at 302 (collecting
criticisms); GEISLER, supra note 99, at 234 (same); Rustum Roy & James R. Ashburn, The Perils
of Peer Review, 414 NATURE 393, 393-94 (2001) (arguing that peer review hinders good science).
103. Raymond E. Spier, Peer Review and Innovation, 8 SCI. & ENGINEERING ETHICS 99, 102
(2002). For stories and examples of delayed recognition, see Bernard Barber, Resistance by
Scientists to Scientific Discovery, 134 SCIENCE 596, 597-602 (1961) (providing examples dating
back to the 19th century); David F. Horrobin, The PhilosophicalBasis of Peer Review and the
Suppression of Innovation, 263 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1438, 1440-1441 (1990) (eighteen examples);
Moti Nissani, The Plight of the Obscure Innovator in Science: A Few Reflections on Campanario's
Note, 25 SOC. STUD. SCI. 165, 171-76 (1995) (forty-seven examples).
104. As one scientist argues, "[It] is not permissible is to write or say something which
contradicts the shared paradigm, and expect it to be tolerated ....because the shared paradigm,
a necessary frame of reference in normal scientific communication, would be undermined." IVOR
CATT, THE CATT ANOMALY 31 (2001), available at http://www.ivorcatt.com/28anom.htm. Often it
is better for a scientist to "stopf1 producing new, and perhaps unsettling, ideas" because
"[r]ewriting or extending the best work of others, or one's best pieces ...could be easier, more
rewarding, and more acceptable." Graciela Chichilnisky, Response, in REJECTED: LEADING
ECONOMISTS PONDER THE PUBLICATION PROCESS 67 (George B. Shepherd ed., 1995). Peer
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often reject anything that clashes with then-existing ideas and
generally accepted theories. 10 5 Second, many factors enter into a
reviewer's calculus which have little or nothing to do with technical
10 6
bias, 0 7 conflicts of interest, 0 8
merit. These include conservatism,
jealously, 10 9 fears of offending the scientific establishment, 110 an

reviewers have rejected many research claims that ultimately transformed science; including
those by future Nobel laureates Enrico Fermi (theory of radioactive decay), Paul Lauterbur
(magnetic resonance imaging), and Hans Krebs (citric acid cycle). See Juan Miguel Campanario,
Rejecting and Resisting Nobel Class Discoveries: Accounts by Nobel Laureates, 81
SCIENTOMETRICS 549, 551-58 (2009) (presenting stories from Nobel laureates rejected by
scientific journals).
105. DAVID SHATZ, PEER REVIEW 10 (2004); see also Chichilnisky, supra note 104, at 57 ("In
my experience, the more innovative and interesting the paper, the more likely it is to be
rejected."); Stephen Lock, Peer Review at Work, 290 BRIT. MED. J. 1555, 1560 (1985) (disclosing
an editor's admission that peer review "favor[s] unadventurous nibblings at the margin of truth
rather than quantum leaps .... "). A recent study reveals that publishing results that do not
positively align with then-existing (mainstream) ideas can have devastating reputational and
pecuniary consequences. See Arthur M. Diamond, Jr., The Career Consequences of a Mistaken
Research Project: The Case of Polywater, 68 AM. J. ECON. SOC. 387, 407 (2009) (concluding that
researchers who wrote about polywater, either pro or con, suffered a negative impact on their
future citations and a concomitant loss of financial income); Robin Hanson, OVERCOMING BIAS:
POX ON BOTH HOUSES (Apr. 30, 2009, 10:00 AM), http://www.overcomingbias.com/2009/04
(opining in response to Diamond's study that "[ilf this is a typical outcome, we can conclude that
academic incentives are to just ignore contrarian claims that you do not believe will become
mainstream").
106. See CHUBIN & HACKETT, supra note 93, at 90 (arguing that journal peer review works
against innovation and reinforces scientific dogma); DERRY, supra note 34, at 138 ("Very
innovative ideas and unexpected results tend to get selectively filtered out, making peer review a
force for conservatism in science."); THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS 64-65 (1962) (explaining that resistance to change will be strong and long-lasting
when a new claim challenges well-accepted paradigms).
107. See SHATZ, supra note 105, at 45-48 (explaining bias in peer review). Potential types of
bias include specialty bias, nationality bias, gender bias, age bias, and a bias toward positive
results. See STEVE FULLER, SCIENCE 73 (1997) (articulating the operation of the "principle of
cumulative advantage" where elite scientists form and maintain closed networks, which means
that "the rich get richer and the poor get poorer in the knowledge production business"); Ann M.
Link, U.S. and Non-U.S. Submissions: An Analysis of Reviewer Bias, 280 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 246,
246-47 (1998) (concluding that U.S. reviewers have a significant preference for U.S. papers);
Richard Smith, Peer Review: A Flawed Process at the Heart of Science Journals, 99 J. ROYAL
SOC'Y MED. 178, 180 (2006) (describing the bias against work which discloses negative results).
108. See Drummond Rennie et al., Conflicts of Interest in the Publication of Science, 266 J.
AM. MED. ASS'N 266, 266-67 (1991) (noting that while no one expects editors to serve as "the
science police," they must ensure that authors and reviewers disclose all potential conflicts).
109. One commentator argues that many reviewers are against innovation unless it is their
own because "[i]nnovation from others may... diminish[] the importance of the scientist's own
work." Horrobin, supra note 103, at 1441.
110. See FULLER, supra note 107, at 65 (explaining that since each scientific discipline has a
few gatekeepers who pass judgment on everyone else, offending one "can be disastrous, much
like failure to pay protection money to the local mafia boss").
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overwhelming interest in quality control,'1 1 and the inability to
recognize brilliance. 112 In sum, whether and when the credibility gate
opens is highly subjective and idiosyncratic.
Perhaps the major downside of this credibility lag for patent
law is that it can compromise patent rights. The right to obtain a
patent is extremely time sensitive. To illustrate, consider an inventor
who files a patent application disclosing a seemingly impossible
invention at time X. The examiner will turn to mainstream science to
determine if the applicant's assertions are (in)credible in light of
contemporary knowledge in the field. 1 3 If the gatekeepers do not
credit the finding until time Y, then the applicant will face an
inevitable rejection. Importantly, refiling at or beyond time Y is often
not a viable option because things have happened that probably have
14
compromised patentability.1
2. What Happens When the Impossible Becomes Possible?
The history of science teaches that what was impossible
yesterday might be possible today. 1 5 Precisely when the impossible
becomes possible depends on several factors including the nature of
the technology, the rate at which knowledge grows within a particular

111. See Sandra Goldbeck-Wood, Evidence on Peer Review-Scientific Quality Control or
Smokescreen, 318 BRIT. MED. J. 44, 45 (1999) (exploring difficulties with finding a bias-free
metric to assess manuscript quality); Horrobin, supra note 103, at 1438 (arguing that "[qluality
control is one means of achieving an end, but it is not the end itself'); id. at 1439 (arguing that
any marginal improvement gained in research quality from rejecting a manuscript is no gain at
all if it's done at the expense of innovation).

112. See David F. Horrobin, Peer Review: A PhilosophicallyFaulty Concept Which Is Proving
Disastrous for Science, in PEER COMMENTARY ON PEER REVIEw 33, 34 (Stevan R. Harnard ed.,
1982) (arguing that since brilliance is rare, a less-than-brilliant reviewer probably would not
recognize it and reject the claim).
113. See supra text accompanying note 89 (describing the link between credibility in
mainstream science and operability in patent law).
114. For example, the Patent Act contains a loss-of-right provision, § 102(b), which precludes
patentability for the inventor's own conduct. Particularly relevant here is that an inventor who
discloses the invention in a printed publication (including a published patent application) more
than one year before filing cannot obtain a patent. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). In the context of the
hypothetical, this means that the application filed at time X can defeat patentability at time Y.
In re Katz, 687 F.2d 450, 454 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
115. See supra text accompanying note 17; see also CEES J. HAMELINK, THE TECHNOLOGY
GAMBLE, at x (1988) (arguing that since "the future cannot be seen as the linear extension of the
past[,] it is essential to believe that what was impossible yesterday is tomorrow's possibility!"); H.
LEE MARTIN, TECHONOMICS 89 (2006) ("[Wlhat was impossible yesterday... becomes possible
today and commonplace tomorrow.").
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field, ingenuity, and serendipity. 116 But regardless of when this
moment occurs, it can still take years for mainstream science to credit
117
the claim.
a. The CredibilityLag in Patent Law
The credibility lag in mainstream science has a parallel in
patent law. Particularly susceptible to this lag are inventions
emerging from nascent technologies; fields in rapid change, in a
primitive stage of development, or in the midst of a technological
118
renaissance; and quests which have a poor track record of success.
But there will always be some lag whenever the PTO looks to
mainstream science to determine if the applicant's assertions are
credible in light of contemporary knowledge because any lag that
exists in mainstream science will unavoidably pass through to the
patent system.
Yet, the patent system exacerbates and protracts any
artifactual lag stemming from mainstream science. To begin,
structural and substantive aspects of patent examination cause a
technological lag. Given the technical nature of the examiner's job, one
might expect this individual to know exactly what is happening at the
forefront of theory and experiment in a particular discipline. However,
this is not the case because the examiner is not an active
researcher." 9 In addition, the current incentive structure for PTO
personnel, combined with the examiner's time pressures and
production goals, afford little, if any, time for professional
development. 120 These realities essentially divorce examiners from the
116. See, e.g., LESLIE ALAN HORVITZ, EUREKA!: SCIENTIFIC BREAKTHROUGHS THAT CHANGED

THE WORLD 1-10 (2002) (exploring various factors).
117. See supra Part II.B.1.
118. See, e.g., In re Swartz, 232 F.3d 862 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (generating energy with "cold
fusion"); Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (perpetual motion machine);
Fregeau v. Mossinghoff, 776 F.2d 1034 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (using a magnetic field to alter the taste
of food); In re Eltgroth, 419 F.2d 918 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (claiming a method for controlling the aging
process); In re Ruskin, 354 F.2d 395 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (increasing the energy output of fossil fuels
through exposure to a magnetic field).
119. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
120. See Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents:
Why Litigation Won't Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review
Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 944-45 (2004) (discussing biased procedures at the
PTO which favor hasty examiner analysis and skewed incentives); Arti K. Rai, Growing Pains in
the Administrative State: The Patent Office's Troubled Quest for ManagerialControl, 157 U. PA.
L. REV. 2051, 2063-67 (2009) (describing examiner compensation and incentives). The amount of
time the PTO allots for an examiner to dispose of a case depends on factors like seniority and the
technology involved. See U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK

2011]

PATENTLYIMPOSSIBLE

1513

frontlines of science. 12 1 The same is true, perhaps even more so, for
judges who hear patent cases. 122 Consequently, patent law inevitably
lags a step or two behind the cutting edge of science and technology.
Compounding this disconnect is evidence of bias against
seemingly impossible inventions. History reveals that the PTO and
the courts have approached seemingly impossible claims with
skepticism for the sake of the public good. As the argument goes, there
is a belief (albeit an incorrect one) among the public and potential
investors 23 that the government never issues patents on inventions
that cannot operate to achieve the intended result. 24 Strict policing of
seemingly impossible claims, therefore, should protect both the public
from potentially harmful products that do not work as claimed and
potential investors from patentees who might seek to defraud them.125
OFFICE: HIRING EFFORTS ARE NOT SUFFICIENT TO REDUCE THE PATENT APPLICATION BACKLOG 7

(2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d071lO2.pdf (discussing production goals).
121. For thoughts on how this technology gap affects patent examination, see JAMES BESSEN
& MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE 161 (2008) (suggesting that the examiners'
unfamiliarity with new technologies and lack of knowledge may hurt patent examination
quality); John R. Allison & Ronald J. Mann, The Disputed Quality of Software Patents, 85 WASH.
U. L. REV. 297, 314 (2007) ( "[P]atent examiners unfamiliar with a cutting-edge technology like
software may be less capable of assessing the quality of the disclosure or of the innovation than
they are in technological areas with which they are more familiar.").
122. For thoughts on the disconnect between the judicial bench and the laboratory bench and
the consequences for patent law, see William D. Noonan, PatentingMedical Technology, 11 J.
LEGAL MED. 263, 264-69 (1990) (tracing the history of the disconnect to technical and subjective
factors); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Factsand Policy:A Multi-InstitutionalApproach to Patent System
Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1068 (2003) (highlighting the lack of technical expertise on the
Federal Circuit); Seymore, Heightened Enablement, supra note 15, at 148-50 (arguing that the
courts misunderstand what constitutes "undue experimentation"); Seymore, Rethinking Novelty,
supra note 15, at 946-57 (exploring how the judiciary's unfamiliarity and discomfort with
complex technologies has impacted the law of novelty).
123. It is axiomatic in patent law that many inventors must rely on investors to cover the
hefty costs of patent procurement and commercialization. See JOHN SAMSON, INVENTIONS AND
THEIR COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT 51 (1896) ('To have the use of capital is nearly always
indispensable for the development of an invention, and, unless the inventor is of that fortunate
class who have the means to work their own patents, he must appeal for support to one or more
people with money."); Craig Allen Nard, Certainty, Fence Building, and the Useful Arts, 74 IND.
L.J. 759, 759 (1999) ('The prospect of certainty in the patentee's property interest has several
benefits, one of which is to create a sense of security which permits the patentee to secure risk
capital from investors, which in turn facilitates the commercialization of the claimed invention."
(citing Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 599 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("[E]ncouragement of
investment-based risk is the fundamental purpose of the patent grant .... "))).
124. Rislove, supra note 14, at 1280 (explaining that while such inventions are technically
unpatentable, the PTO lets some inoperable inventions slip through the cracks).
125. Id. For example, there was a time when the PTO and several judges believed that
clinical evidence or FDA approval should be a prerequisite for patenting drugs which appear
unsafe or risky. Compare In re Hartop, 311 F.2d 249, 260 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (Smith, J., concurring)
(criticizing the PTO's position that it was "carrying out its statutory duty, when [it] required
proof of safety and effectiveness in man"), with id. at 263-66 (Worley, C.J., dissenting) (agreeing
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Judge Giles Rich agreed, arguing that granting patents on seemingly
impossible inventions violates public policy. 126 So it appears that
elucidating what a PHOSITA would believe can devolve into a
subjective judgment about the subject matter. Thus, for some quests,
the PTO and the courts may develop a bias against patentability.
b. Example: The Legitimization of Baldness Treatment as a Credible
Field
The pursuit of patents related to baldness treatments provides
an excellent example of the contours of the credibility lag in patent
law. The pervasiveness of hair loss, 12 7 its social impact,1 28 and the

with the PTO that Congress intended for it to work cooperatively with other agencies to ensure
safety and effectiveness). Now it is clear that drug safety is not the PTO's responsibility. See
Scott v. Finney, 34 F.3d 1058, 1063-64 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (explaining that § 101 and other
provisions of the patent statutes do not establish safety as a patentability criterion); In re
Anthony, 414 F.2d 1383, 1455-56 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (same); see also In re Sichert, 566 F.2d 1154,
1160 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (noting that a minimal level of safety will satisfy § 101).
126. In re Citron, 325 F.2d 248, 253 (C.C.P.A. 1963) (discussed infra Part II.B.2(c)); see also
Isenstead v. Watson, 157 F. Supp. 7, 9 (D.D.C. 1957) (contending that the patent grant "gives a
kind of official imprimatur to the [invention] in question on which as a moral matter some
members of the public are likely to rely."). The fear is that some might view the patent grant,
albeit improperly, as the government's endorsement of the technology. See Cynthia M. Ho,
Splicing Morality and Patent Law: Issues Arising from Mixing Mice and Men, 2 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL'Y 247, 253 n.29 (2000) (noting that issuing patents covering controversial technologies might
be viewed as governmental endorsement); Timothy R. Holbrook, The Expressive Impact of
Patents, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 573, 599-600 (2006) (explaining that governments may choose to
deny patents on certain inventions in order to eliminate the signal of perceived endorsement or
encouragement). A patentee might also "advertise its patent to convince gullible consumers that
a patent represents the government's endorsement or imprimatur that the advertised product is
actually effective." Christopher R. Leslie, Patents of Damocles, 83 IND. L.J. 133, 144 (2008)
(citation omitted). But see Hartop, 311 F.2d at 263 ("[Tlhe issuance of a patent is not in fact an
[A patent] is no guarantee of
'imprimatur' as to . . . safety and effectiveness ....
anything .... The public, therefore, is in no way protected either by the granting or withholding
of a patent.").
127. See Ron Shapiro & Valerie D. Callender, Hair Transplantation,in HAIR AND SCALP
DISEASES 175, 175 (Amy J. McMichael & Maria K. Hordinsky eds., 2008) (noting that, in modern
times, more than fifty percent of men and twenty-five percent of women suffer from some degree
of hair loss).
128. Throughout history, a full head of hair has been viewed as a sign of strength and
virility. Perhaps the most famous story is that of Samson and Delilah:
So Delilah said to Samson, "Tell me the secret of your great strength .. " So he told her
If my head were
everything. "No razor has ever been used on my head," he said ....
shaved, my strength would leave me, and I would become as weak as any other
man."... After putting him to sleep on her lap, she called for someone to shave off the
seven braids of his hair, and so began to subdue him. And his strength left him.
Judges 16:6, 17, 19 (New International).
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sensitive nature of the topic 129 may explain why reversing baldness
has been an obsession since ancient times. 130 History reveals, however,
that most purported baldness cures have not worked. 131 So it is not
surprising that inventors seeking patents on purported cures once
faced huge credibility hurdles. But it appears that several meritorious
claims fell through the cracks because it took the PTO and the courts
a long time to recognize that it is possible to treat baldness.
The legal saga began with In re Oberweger,132 a 1940 case in
which the applicant claimed that treating the scalp with a paste
1 33
containing bone marrow, clover oil, and alcohol could regrow hair.
Recognizing that the prior art 134 contained "little of a successful
nature,"'3 5 the applicant bolstered the claim with testimonials and an
affidavit from a medical doctor attesting to the efficacy of the
treatment. 136 Nevertheless, the PTO deemed the invention inoperable
"since compositions for growing hair on the human scalp have

129. Again, the Old Testament provides a famous example. One day the prophet Elisha, who
lost most of his hair at a young age, faced mockery from a group of boys while on a journey. See
THOMAS J. CRAUGHWELL, BAD KIDS OF THE BIBLE 225-30 (2008) (comparing the story to The
Lord of the Flies). According to Craughwell, "[T]his mockery of his hairless head made Elisha a
mite peevish." Id. at 228. Indeed, it led to a gruesome result:
Elisha went up to Bethel. As he was walking along the road, some boys came out of the
town and jeered at him. "Get out of here, baldy!" they said. "Get out of here, baldy!" He
turned around, looked at them and called down a curse on them in the name of the Lord.
Then two bears came out of the woods and mauled forty-two of the boys. And he went on
to Mount Carmel ....
2 Kings 2:23-25 (New International).
130. See generally KERRY SEGRAVE, BALDNESS: A SOCIAL HISTORY 32-65 (1996) (exploring
various quests and treatments throughout history); id. at 3 (discussing the first written medical
record from ancient Egypt of recipes for baldness treatment).
131. For a brief historical account of the various quests, see CHRISTOPHER WANJER, BAD
MEDICINE 48-52 (2003). Contemporary treatments include topical applications, drugs, herbal
remedies, massage techniques, and lifestyle changes. See generally D.J. VERRET, PATIENT GUIDE
TO HAIR Loss & HAIR RESTORATION (2009).
132. 115 F.2d 826 (C.C.P.A. 1940).
133. Id. at 827.
134. Prior art "constitutes ... documentary sources (patents and publications from anywhere
in the world) and non-documentary sources (things known, used or invented in the United
States)" that may be used to determine the novelty and nonobviousness of claimed subject
matter in a patent application or patent. 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, GLOSSARY,
G-8 (2010) [hereinafter CHISUM]; see also Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d
1437, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (defining prior art as accessible technology in the public domain).
135. Oberweger, 115 F.2d at 827.
136. Id. When an applicant submits affidavits as proof of operability, they should show a
nexus between the intended result and the supporting evidence. See supra note 62 and
accompanying text.
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uniformly proven unreliable."'137 The U.S. Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals ("C.C.P.A.")1 8 agreed and affirmed the rejection:
Certainly there is nothing in this record to show that appellant's composition is any
better than the many hundreds of similar concoctions that have been advertised and sold
to a credulous public since the beginning of recorded history. It is a matter of common
knowledge that numerous preparations... have been advertised and sold for the
to the human
purpose of producing hair on bald heads ...[which are] often harmful
39
body and.., generally understood to be a fraud upon the public.1

Aside from the court's improper comparison of the claimed
invention to the prior art 140 and its heavy reliance on common
knowledge to determine truth,' 4 ' notably absent from the opinion was
any discussion of the invention's scientific underpinnings or technical
merit. Thus, it appears that the court deemed the baldness treatment
42
a Type II impossibility. 1
The C.C.P.A. had to contend with baldness again almost thirty
years later in In re Ferens. 43 In that case, the applicant claimed that
applying electric current combined with a lanolin ointment containing
144
the extract of the jaborandi plant to the scalp could regrow hair.
Here too the applicant buttressed the claim with affidavits from a
medical doctor and twenty-one laypersons treated with the purported
cure.' 45 Although the applicant admittedly could have proffered more
probative evidence, 146 from a technical standpoint the applicant's
assertion was not inherently unbelievable because there were
numerous reports in the scientific literature that pilocarpoine, a
137. Oberweger, 115 F.2d at 827. That the claimed composition comprised cheap and
ordinary substances certainly raised suspicion. Indeed, the Oberweger court cited a case where
the court invalidated a patent which claimed that a face cream made with whole milk could
1939)
whiten skin. Id. at 828 (citing Hall v. Duart Sales Co., 28 F. Supp. 838, 839 (N.D. Ill.
(invalidating Massage and Cleansing Cream and Method of Preparing the Same, U.S. Pat. No.
1,668,503 (issued May 1, 1928), for a lack of utility because the addition of milk to the cream
"d[id] nothing').
138. The C.C.P.A. was a predecessor to the Federal Circuit. See discussion supranote 8.
139. Oberweger, 115 F.2d at 829 (emphasis added).
140. An invention need not possess some definite advantage over the prior art in order to be
patentable. See sources cited supra note 59.
141. See supra note 55 (exploring the limits of facts asserted to be common knowledge).
142. See supra text accompanying note 29.
143. 417 F.2d 1072 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
144. Id. at 1073. Jaborandi is an herbal shrub with small reddish-purple flowers found
mainly in Brazil. BEN-ERIK VAN WYK & MICHAEL WINK, MEDICINAL PLANTS OF THE WORLD 239
(2004).
145. Ferens, 417 F.2d at 1074.
146. The court found the affidavits unpersuasive because they did not show a nexus between
the intended result and the supporting evidence (in other words, that the intended result came
from the invention and not from some other source). Id. at 1075. The court also doubted that a
neuropsychiatrist could credibly opine on hair growth. Id.
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pharmacologically active compound found in jaborandi leaves, could
stimulate hair (re)growth. 147 This did not matter because the PTO and
the C.C.P.A. once again deemed the invention impossible without
exploring its scientific and technical merit. Thus, baldness treatments
remained pigeonholed as Type I or Type II inventions because they
belonged to "a field of endeavor where little of a successful nature
ha[d] been developed despite constant effort... ,"148
Eventually the field emerged from the pigeonhole. One decade
after Ferens, Upjohn obtained a patent for a method of using minoxidil
(trade name Rogaine) to grow hair.1 49 The PTO subsequently granted
hundreds of patents for methods of treating baldness. Many of them
disclose treatments using rudimentary techniques and mundane
materials previously frowned upon, including jaborandi.1 50 The
Federal Circuit completed the legitimization process in 1999 in In re
Cortright,151 when it proclaimed that treating baldness is "[not] an
152
inherently unbelievable undertaking."
c. Another Example: The Recognition of Cancer as a Treatable Disease
For most of the twentieth century, the PTO and the courts
were highly skeptical of any invention that purported to effectively
147. See, e.g., HOBART A. HARE, A TEXTBOOK OF PRACTICAL THERAPEUTICS 322 (1897)
(providing a recipe for making a hair tonic for reversing partial baldness with jaborandi extract
which contains an optimal level of pilocarpine); GEORGE T. JACKSON, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON
THE DISEASES OF THE HAIR AND SCALP 135 (1898) (reporting successful cases of hair regrowth in
patients whose scalps were treated with a jaborandi paste over several weeks); Baldness and Its
Treatment, 2 LANCET 376, 376 (1892) (noting that the direct injection of either pilocarpine or an
alcoholic extract of the jaborandi plant promotes hair growth but is too powerful a remedy for
indiscriminate use). Pilocarpine works by increasing the blood circulation around hair follicles
and opening skin pores (which has the added benefit of promoting the uptake of other compounds
into the scalp). STEVEN FOSTER & REBECCA L. JOHNSON, DESK REFERENCE TO NATURE'S
MEDICINE 219 (2006).
148. Ferens, 417 F.2d at 1074.
149. See 6-Amino-4-(Substituted Amino)-1,2-Dihydro-1-Hydroxy-2-Iminopyrimidine, Topical
Compositions and Process for Hair Growth, U.S. Patent No. 4,139,619 (filed Aug. 19, 1977)
(issued Feb. 13, 1979). Interestingly, Upjohn originally developed minoxidil in pill form to treat
high blood pressure. See JOHN TOEDT ET AL., CHEMICAL COMPOSITION OF EVERYDAY PRODUCTS
40 (2005). However, the drug had an unexpected side effect: people who took it grew hair in an
unexpected manner on their cheeks, foreheads, hands, and in other places. See SPENCER D.
KOBREN, THE BALD TRUTH 4 (2000) (telling the minoxidil story). Researchers soon figured out
that applying minoxidil directly on a balding scalp might regrow hair on it. Id. Minoxidil is one of
two FDA-approved treatments for treating male pattern baldness. See VERRET, supra note 131,
at 49.
150. See Composition and Method to Promote Human Hair Growth, U.S. Patent No.
7,238,375 (filed Dec. 20, 2004).
151. 165 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
152. Id. at 1357.
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treat cancer. 153 Applicants claiming success faced a formidable-if not
insurmountable-patentability hurdle because the courts allowed the
PTO to impose a very high burden on the applicant to prove
154 •
operability.
The landmark opinion from this era is In re Citron,155 a 1963
case in which an applicant alleged that a serum containing hormonelike compounds extracted from cancerous tissue could inhibit the
inception and growth of certain types of cancer and effectively treat
the disease. 156 The applicant's disclosure described how to make the
serum, provided analytical data, and contained a working example
7
purporting to show its effectiveness in rats and humans.1 5
Nevertheless, the examiner rejected the claim under § 101 and found
that the applicant had not sustained his burden to prove
operability. 158 The Board affirmed, explaining that the invention was
"apparently inoperative" 15 9 and in light of contemporary knowledge in
the art "[could not] be accepted as operative absent clear and
convincing proof thereof."1 60 Shifting the burden of proof to the
applicant and ratcheting up the standard of proof required for the
applicant to prevail were both in line with recent C.C.P.A.
161
precedent.
153. See, e.g., Ex parte Moore, 128 U.S.P.Q. 8, 9-10 (Bd. Pat. App. 1960) (determining that
any suggestion that the claimed compounds could treat cancer was incredible and misleading).
One exception occurred in 1959 when the PTO allowed a single medical use claim for a drug
useful in bringing about remission in myeloid leukemia. See Exparte Timmis, 123 U.S.P.Q. 581,
583 (Bd. Pat. App. 1959) (overturning the examiner's § 101 rejection). But this occurred only
after two prior appeals to the Board and overwhelming evidence which included "voluminous"
clinical evidence, prior FDA approval, endorsement by the American Medical Association,
patient affidavits, peer reviewed publications, and testimony that "spontaneous remissions are
rare in cases of leukemia." Id. at 581-82.
154. See, e.g., Timmis, 123 U.S.P.Q. at 581 (discussed supranote 153). This lies in contrast to
the status quo, which places the burden on the PTO to prove inoperability. See discussion supra
Part II.A.1; infra notes 176-177 and accompanying text.
155. 325 F.2d 248 (C.C.P.A. 1963).
156. Id. at 251 (quoting from the written description of the invention in the application).
157. See id. at 251-52. Although the disclosure did not identify the hormone-like compounds
by name or structure, C.C.P.A. precedent permitted an applicant to claim a product by the
process of making it if there was no other way to define it. In re McKee, 95 F.2d 264, 266
(C.C.P.A. 1938) (sanctioning product-by-process claims).
158. Citron, 325 F.2d at 252.
159. Id.
160. Id.; cf. In re Ferens, 417 F.2d 1072, 1074 (C.C.P.A. 1969) ("Evidence submitted to
establish usefulness must be such as would be clear and convincing to [a PHOSITA].").
161. In In re Chilowsky, 229 F.2d 457 (C.C.P.A. 1956), the court identified three types of
operability cases and the requisite proof for each:
[I]n the usual case where the mode of operation alleged can be readily understood and
conforms to the known laws of physics and chemistry, operativeness is not questioned,
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Writing for the court, Judge Giles Rich affirmed the Board's
decision and provided several rationales for doing so:
[W]here claimed compounds are alleged ... to have a utility of as much public
importance as is the effective treatment of cancer, which alleged utility appears to be
incredible in the light of the knowledge of the art, or factually misleading, [the]
applicant must establish the asserted utility by acceptable proof....
[W]hen an applicant bases utility for a claimed invention on allegations of the sort made
by appellants here, unless [a PHOSITA] would accept those allegations as obviously
valid and correct, it is proper for the examiner to ask for evidence which substantiates
them....
[I]t is against public policy to place the oblique imprimatur of the Government via the
patent grant on incredible or misleading unproven assertions in view of the1 possibility
of
62
exploitation of such statements in issued patents by unscrupulous persons.

This heavy burden imposed upon the applicant reveals the
163
then-existing "double standard" for therapeutic inventions.

and no further evidence is required. On the other hand, if the alleged operation seems
clearly to conflict with a recognized scientific principle as, for example, where an
applicant purports to have discovered a machine producing perpetual motion, the
presumption of inoperativeness is so strong that very clear evidence is required to
overcome it. A third type of case was involved in In re Perrigo, 48 F.2d 965 [C.C.P.A.
19311, wherein the device involved was of such a nature that it could not be tested by
any known scientific principles. In such a case, as we there held, it is incumbent on the
applicant to demonstrate the workability and utility of the device and make clear the
principles on which it operates.
Id. at 462; see also Irving Marcus, The Patent Office and PharmaceuticalInvention, 47 J. PAT.
OFF. SOC'Y 669, 673 (1965) (explaining that, from the perspective of the examining corps and in
accord with C.C.P.A. precedent, heightened proof is required if human use is involved and the
condition is one which is difficult to treat).
162. Citron, 325 F.2d at 253 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In his opinion
Judge Rich cited with approval Ex parte Moore, 128 U.S.P.Q. 8, 9 (Bd. Pat. App. 1960). Citron,
325 F.2d at 253. There the Board stated the following:
The Office is particularly bound to take notice of the question of utility, because ... a
[patent] grant is an assurance to the public of the conclusions of the Office .... Cases
are not unknown where patents have been secured... and then used simply to impose
on a public not disposed to scrutinize closely the merits of a matter upon which the
Patent Office has set the seal of its approval.
Id. (quoting Exparte De Bausset, 43 O.G. 1583, 1585 (1888)).
163. 4 CHISUM, supra note 134, § 4.04[2]; see also Joseph Gray Jackson, Address at the
Institute of Patent Law of the Southwest Legal Foundation (Mar. 30, 1967) (observing that while
utility is readily accepted without question for new machines, "[aln elaborate ritual dance is
required to satisfy the Patent Office as to the disclosure of [the] utility of a drug"), quoted in In re
Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 958 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (Rich, J., dissenting). Professor Chisum has explained
why the double standard existed:
The stern view of earlier cases was in reaction to the fact that "it was common in the
19th century to emphasize in advertising the fact that an article was patented. For
instance, the phrase 'patent medicine' arises from the widespread sale of patented
compounds as medical remedies of various degrees of efficacy." Emphasis on the
"patented" status of any product tends to be misleading to the general public because
the standards of patentability focus primarily on novelty and not on comparative utility.
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Particularly troubling from a technical standpoint was the absence of
any discussion of the claimed invention's scientific merit or clear
articulation of the type of proof required to demonstrate operability. 164
The tide began to turn in 1980 when the C.C.P.A. explicitly
stated that effectively treating cancer is not impossible. In In re
Jolles,16 5 the court reversed the PTO's rejection of a patent for a drug
claiming to effectively induce remission in leukemia patients. 166 In
doing so, the court announced that "the medical treatment of a specific
cancer is not such an inherently unbelievable undertaking or involves
167
such implausible scientific principles as to be considered incredible."'
However, the double standard persisted because applicants had to
substantiate their claims with heightened proof in the form of clinical
data showing therapeutic efficacy in humans. 168
The situation improved in 1995 when the Federal Circuit
issued its decision in In re Brana. 69 There the applicant had been
denied a patent for certain antitumor compounds for lack of utility
because the PTO took the position that efficacy in animals with cancer
was insufficient to establish a reasonable expectation of efficacy in
humans.' 70 The court began by unequivocally reiterating that "[t]he
But the problem was perceived as more severe with products closely connected with
human health.
4 CHISUM, supra, § 4.04[2][a] (quoting EDMUND W. KITCH & HARVEY S. PERLMAN, LEGAL
REGULATION OF THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS 721 (1st ed. 1972)).
164. See 4 CHISUM, supra note 134, § 4.04[2] [a] (noting that the older C.C.P.A. cases "did not
clearly resolve the issue of what the standard of proof of the effectiveness of a therapeutic
product should be"); Marcus, supra note 161, at 676 (noting the challenges faced by the PTO in
establishing uniform policies in therapeutic cases).
165. 628 F.2d 1322 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
166. See id. at 1327-28 (noting that the Board failed to give sufficient weight to animal
studies because "such testing is relevant to utility in humans" and that a PHOSITA considering
the entire record "would accept the [applicant's] claimed utility in humans as valid and correct").
167. Id. at 1327.
168. See id. ('CWhen utility as a drug, medicant, and the like in human therapy is alleged, it
is proper for the examiner to ask for substantiating evidence unless [a PHOSITA] would accept
the allegations as obviously correct." (citing In re Novak, 306 F.2d 924, 928 (C.C.P.A. 1962)); see
also Ex parte Busse, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1908, 1909 (B.P.A.I. 1986) (explaining that while the art of
cancer treatment had advanced markedly since Citron to the extent that treating or curing it
was no longer incredible, "unusual" asserted utilities justify the requirement for substantiating
evidence); Jackson, supra note 163 ("If the drug is to be applied to humans, the Patent Office
usually requires clinical tests, that is, tests on human patients."), quoted in Kirk, 376 F.2d at 958
(Rich, J., dissenting). If the applicant provided no substantiating evidence or only speculative
statements, a rejection was guaranteed. See, e.g., Ex parte Stevens, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1379, 1380
(B.P.A.I. 1990) (no substantiating evidence provided); Busse, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1909 (determining
that applicant's statement that the disclosed results "warrant[ed] further study" was insufficient
to establish utility).
169. 51 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
170. Id. at 1563.
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purpose of treating cancer with chemical compounds does not suggest
an inherently unbelievable undertaking or involve implausible
scientific principles." 171 The court had to finally decide what exactly an
applicant must prove in order to establish utility for a pharmaceutical
invention. 172 As to the specific facts of the case, the court held that
efficacy in animals was sufficient to establish utility."73 Thus,
applicants for drug patents need not perform human testing before
174
patent issuance.
But these facts also gave the court an opportunity to confront
two issues that further eroded the double standard for therapeutic
inventions and shaped the contours of modern utility doctrine. First,
the court adopted a uniform evidentiary framework for gauging
compliance with § 101. It held that since an application as filed
standards
for
complies
with the statutory
presumptively
patentability,1 75 both the initial and ultimate burdens of proving lack
of utility rest with the PTO.1 76 Hence, the same burden-shifting
framework used to gauge compliance with novelty, nonobviousness,
1 77
and the disclosure requirements also applies to utility.
Second, the court took the position that § 101 should not be
construed in such a way as to hinder research and development

171. Id. at 1566 (citing In re Jolles, 628 F.2d 1322, 1327 (C.C.P.A. 1980)).
172. Id. at 1564.
173. Id. at 1567 (citing In re Krimmel, 292 F.2d 948, 953 (C.C.P.A. 1961) (determining that
testing with experimental animals can establish utility)) (explaining that in vivo and animal
testing are sufficient).
174. Id.; see also Scott v. Finney, 34 F.3d 1058, 1063 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("Title 35 does not
demand that such human testing occur within the confines of [PTO] proceedings.").
175. See In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (describing the PTO's burden to
establish a prima facie case of unpatentability); id. at 1449 (Plager, J., concurring) (explaining
that an applicant is entitled to a patent unless the PTO can prove otherwise).
176. See In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (applying the evidentiary
framework articulated for enablement in In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 223 (C.C.P.A. 1971), to
the utility context); see also MPEP, supra note 47, § 2107(II)(D) ("Office personnel are reminded
that they must treat as true a statement of fact made by an applicant in relation to an asserted
utility, unless countervailing evidence can be provided .... ). The C.C.P.A. laid the foundation
for the presumption of utility in a case nearly thirty years earlier. See In re Gazave, 379 F.2d
973, 977 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (reminding the PTO that "[iun the absence of any apparent reason why
the compounds disclosed will not so function, or of any evidence showing that they actually do
not, the statements in the application are generally deemed sufficient").
177. See Brana, 51 F.3d at 1566 ("Only after the PTO provides evidence showing that [a
PHOSITA] would reasonably doubt the asserted utility does the burden shift to the applicant to
provide rebuttal evidence sufficient to convince such a person of the invention's asserted
utility.").
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("R&D"). 178 It now had to revisit the extent to which U.S. Food and
Drug Administration ("FDA") Phase II clinical studiesI 79-pertaining
to the efficacy and safety of the drug-impact the utility
determination.1 8 0 The court explained that FDA approval is not a
prerequisite for patentability:
Usefulness in patent law, and in particular in the context of pharmaceutical inventions, necessarily
includes the expectation of further research and development. The stage at which an invention in this
field becomes useful is well before it is ready to be administered to humans. Were we to require Phase
II testing in order to prove utility, the associated costs would prevent many companies from obtaining
patent protection on promising new inventions, thereby eliminating an incentive to pursue, through
18 1
research and development, potential cures in many crucial areas such as the treatment of cancer.

By further removing the vestiges of the double standard, Brana
has become a hallmark of modern utility doctrine because it explained
how an overly stringent interpretation of § 101 could stifle scientific
research, hinder innovation, and frustrate other goals of patent
policy.182 That may be all well and good, but it is somewhat troubling
to consider the number of meritorious inventions that probably slipped
through the cracks when the double standard was still the law of the
18 3
land.

178. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Analyze This: A Law and Economics Agenda for the Patent
System, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2081, 2086 (2000) (noting that the PTO's strict interpretation of § 101
"provoked sharp rebuke" from the Federal Circuit in Brana).
179. Drugs typically undergo three phases of clinical testing to explore their safety and
efficacy. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2011). Briefly, Phase I involves limited human clinical trials to elicit
basic safety data and to evaluate dosing and how a drug is metabolized; Phase II expands the
testing to a larger group of subjects with the disease to test efficacy and safety; and Phase III
involves an even larger group of subject and explores long-term evaluation of the drug's efficacy
and safety. Id. § 312.21(a)-(c). After Phase III, the FDA determines whether the drug should be
marketed.
180. Brana, 51 F.3d at 1567-68. The C.C.P.A. had dealt with this issue previously. See
discussion supra note 125 and cases cited therein.
181. Brana, 51 F.3d at 1568.
182. See, e.g., infra notes 285-286 and accompanying text (discussing the goal of early public
disclosure). One commentator argues that if the Brana court had upheld the stringent utility
requirement urged by the PTO, it "[ran] the risk of seriously inhibiting the incentives to compete
among biotechnology companies and, therefore, jeopardize [d] the very existence of the industry."
Kevin C. Hooper, Utility and Non-Operability Standards in Biotechnology Patent Prosecution:
CAFC Precedent Versus PTO Practice, 36 IDEA 203, 250 (1996). On the other hand, a utility
standard set too low "could impede scientific progress by creating a transaction-cost-heavy
thicket of patents on basic research." Rai, supra note 122, at 1131-32.
183. For instance, as Professors Burk and Lemley have explained, "[B]y the time the
developer of a new drug could show efficacy [in humans], they would likely have lost patent
protection under [35 U.S.C. §] 102(b)." BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 2, at 111. Briefly, § 102(b)
dedicates an invention to the public if the applicant does not file a patent application within one
year of a public disclosure. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) (discussed supra note 114 and infra note
283).
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d. Normative Thoughts
These two examples show that technical merit and good science
can ultimately triumph over skepticism and subjective bias. 18 4 The
legitimization of baldness and cancer treatments also underscores that
"[t]he mere fact that something has not previously been done clearly is
not, in itself, a sufficient basis for rejecting all applications purporting

to disclose how to do

it."185

But with that said, examiners are still

instructed to "determine if the asserted utility for the invention is
credible based on the information disclosed in the application" and to
deny patents when this is not the case. 8 6 This keeps the door open for
the PTO and the courts to miscategorize inventions as impossible.
As a normative matter, this regime is unsettling for at least
three reasons. First, science has evolved to a point where "the levels of
complexity and specialization make it nearly impossible for [anyone]
who is not intimately familiar with the activity[] to effectively and
credibly evaluate it and its outcomes."' 8 7 Second, given that
operability is an objective question (either an invention works or it
does not), an applicant who presents a meritorious claim should not
face rejection because of subjective credibility assessments. Third,
credibility lags prevent the patent system from sitting at the cutting
edge of technology, 8 8 a place where patent protection is often
crucial.189
184. But there have been some near misses. See Horrobin, supra note 103, at 1439-41
(providing examples including the ability of lithium to act as a psychiatric drug and Krebs' citric
acid cycle).
185. Gould v. Quigg, 822 F.2d 1074, 1078 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (quoting In re Chilowsky, 229 F.2d
457, 461 (C.C.P.A. 1956)); cf. MPEP, supra note 47, § 2107.03 ('The fact that there is no known
cure for a disease ...cannot serve as the basis for a conclusion that such an invention lacks
utility.").
186. MPEP, supra note 47, § 2107.03 (emphasis added).
187. GEISLER, supra note 99, at 219.
188. Cf. Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards:Economic Perspectives
on Innovation, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 803, 876 (1988) (arguing that the patent system should not
employ a patentability test which compromises its primary goal to promote technological
progress); see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51 (1989)
(noting that the patent system seeks to incentivize inventors who in turn provide the public with
new and useful advances in technology); COMM'N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS IN THE
KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECON., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
41 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004) (explaining that accommodating new technologies is an
important condition for innovation).
189. See, e.g., Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 2, at 1504-05 (suggesting that a firm
may obtain a patent to "stake their claim" in an area of technology to signal to investors and
competitors that it operates at the cutting edge); Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
625, 647-49 (2002) (arguing that firms obtain patents to show their R&D acumen or
technological capacity).
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III. TOWARD OBJECTIVE GATEKEEPING

A. Theoretical Underpinningsof the ProposedFramework
The key technical question for gauging operability under § 101
is whether the invention can achieve the intended result. 19 Closely
related to operability is the enablement requirement of § 112 1.191
Aside from policing claim scope, 192 it ensures that a PHOSITA can
actually make and use what the applicant discloses.193 Thus,
operability and enablement both help to safeguard the technical
integrity of issued patents by screening out inventions that cannot
work.194
Given the close relationship between the two statutory
requirements, one might ask if it is possible to merge the § 101 and
§ 112
1 analyses into a single issue when operability is contested.
95
While a merger is possible, the single focus should be enablement.1
As explained below, a robust enablement analysis can effectively
190. In re Cortright, 165 F.3d 1353, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also In re Ruskin, 354 F.2d
395, 396 (C.C.P.A. 1966) ("A process is operative if it produces its intended result.").
191. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
192. Claim scope is the "technological territory" that the inventor claims is his or hers to
control. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 839, 844 (1990); see also Kara Tech. Inc. v. Stamps.com Inc., 582 F.3d 1341,
1347-48 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ("It is the claims that define the metes and bounds of the patentee's
invention ... [and] define the scope of patent protection." (citing Corning Glass Works v.
Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). Enablement serves as a
constraint on claim scope. See O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 121 (1854) (explaining
that a patentee "can lawfully claim only what he has invented and described, and if he claims
more his patent is void"); Nat'l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d
1190, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (explaining that the purpose of the enablement requirement is to
"ensured that the public knowledge is enriched by the patent specification to a degree at least
commensurate with the scope of the claims"); Merges & Nelson, supra, at 845-52. The scope of
enablement is the sum of what is taught in the written description plus what is known by a
PHOSITA without undue experimentation. Nat'l Recovery Techs., 166 F.3d at 1196.
193. Bayer AG v. Schein Pharms., Inc., 301 F.3d 1306, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ('The
enablement requirement ensures that that a specification shall disclose an invention in such a
manner as will enable one skilled in the art to make and utilize it.").
194. As the Federal Circuit recently explained:
Enablement is closely related to the requirement for utility, [which] prevents mere ideas
from being patented. As we noted [previously], "[p]atent protection is granted in return
for an enabling disclosure of an invention, not for vague intimations of general ideas
that may or may not be workable .... Tossing out the mere germ of an idea does not
constitute enabling disclosure."
In re '318 Patent Infringement Litig., 583 F.3d 1317, 1323-24 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting
Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
195. In a nonprecedential opinion dealing with cold fusion, the Federal Circuit seemingly did
the opposite; meaning that the court collapsed the two issues into a question of operability. See
In re Dash, 118 F. App'x 488, 490-92 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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ferret out impossible inventions by itself with no need for or help from
1 can perform the
its statutory cousin. 196 Importantly, § 112
gatekeeping role through an objective, technical analysis rather than
through subjective credibility assessments that lie at the heart of the
operability paradigm.197 This enablement-based approach for
determining whether an invention works would eliminate the need for
the § 101 operability requirement. 198
1 can perform the gatekeeping
Before explaining how § 112
role, it is important to define more precisely what it means for an
invention to be enabled. Enablement exists if a PHOSITA, after
reading the applicant's disclosure, can practice the full scope of the
claimed invention at the time of filing 99 without undue
experimentation. 20 0 Enablement is a legal conclusion that rests on
20 1
underlying factual inquiries.
In In re Wands, the Federal Circuit set forth several factors
relevant to the enablement analysis. 20 2 They are: (1) the amount of

196. See infra Part III.C.
197. See infra notes 202-203 and accompanying text. For references to the objective nature
of the enablement requirement, see Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1366
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Rader, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that
enablement is an objective inquiry which focuses on the four corners of the applicant's written
description); Bayer, 301 F.3d at 1314 (explaining that "an enabling disclosure by definition turns
upon the objective understanding of a [PHOSITA]"); Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043,
1050 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("[T]he enablement requirement ... looks to the objective knowledge of [a
PHOSITA].Y); In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 223 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (explaining that since § 112 1
only requires "objective" enablement, precisely how an applicant complies with it is immaterial);
2 R. CARL MOY, MOY'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 7:45 (4th ed. 2008) (noting that enablement
"address[es] whether the technological quality of the [applicant's disclosure] meets an objective,
minimum standard").
198. In addition, it might be easier for an examiner to build and sustain a nonenablement
rejection than one based on inoperability. Chambers, supra note 57, at 96.
199. In re Glass, 492 F.2d 1228, 1232 (C.C.P.A. 1974); accord Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene,
Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1371-72 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (explaining that in both patent examination and
litigation the enablement determination "is made retrospectively, i.e., by looking back to the filing
date of the patent application and determining whether undue experimentation would have been
required to make and use the claimed invention at that time."); In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 607
(C.C.P.A. 1977) (reaffirming rule).
200. In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC,
516 F.3d 993, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (reaffirming the standard). If the disclosure lacks sufficient
detail, a PHOSITA can presumably rely on knowledge in the field to fill in the missing
information. AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac & Ugine, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003). While
"undue experimentation" does not appear in the statute, "it is well established that enablement
requires that the specification teach those in the art to make and use the invention without
undue experimentation." In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
201. Sitrick, 516 F.3d at 999. For the applicable standards of review for enablement, see
supra note 71.
202. 858 F.2d at 737.
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direction or guidance presented in the disclosure; (2) the existence of
working examples; (3) the nature of the invention; (4) the
predictability or unpredictability of the art; (5) the PHOSITA's level of
skill; (6) the state of the prior art; (7) the breadth of the claims; and (8)
the quantity of experimentation necessary to practice the claimed
invention. 2 3 While not mandatory, 20 4 the Wands factors are
ubiquitous in evaluating enablement 205-probably because they touch
on issues that are important in virtually all enablement
determinations. 20 6 These include issues related to the technical scope
and substance of the disclosure (factors one and two), 20 7 the nature of
the technology (factors three and four), 208 the PHOSITA's knowledge
2 10
and skill (factor five), 20 9 and the claim scope sought (factor seven).

203. Id. The list of factors found its roots in the PTO. See Exparte Forman, 230 U.S.P.Q. 546,
547 (B.P.A.I. 1986) (articulating eight factors for determining undue experimentation).
204. See Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that
the Wands factors are illustrative and not mandatory).
205. See 3 CHISUM, supra note 134, § 7.03 (collecting cases).
206. The factors are interrelated. For example, if the PHOSITA is really smart (factor five),
an applicant need not disclose what the PHOSITA already knows or can easily figure out (factors
one and two). Webster Loom Co. v. Higgins, 105 U.S. 580, 586 (1881) ("[A patentee] may begin at
the point where his invention begins, and describe what he has made that is new...."); SpectraPhysics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("A patent need not teach,
and preferably omits, what is well known in the art.").
207. The technical substance of the disclosure lies at the heart of the enablement analysis.
See supra notes 192, 193, 200, and accompanying text. The two factors are clustered together
because working examples are a form of guidance. Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 15,
at 641-46.
208. One way to determine the requisite amount of teaching is whether the underlying
technology is "unpredictable" or "predictable." The experimental sciences are regarded as
"unpredictable" because PHOSITAs often cannot predict if a reaction protocol that works for one
embodiment will work for others. See, e.g., Cedarapids, Inc. v. Nordberg, Inc., No. 95-1529, 1997
WL 452801 at *2 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 11, 1997) (explaining that in the chemical arts, "a slight
variation . . . can yield an unpredictable result or may not work at all"). On the other hand,
inventions in applied technologies like mechanical engineering are often regarded as
"predictable" arts because they are rooted in well-defined, predictable factors. In re Vaeck, 947
F.2d 488, 496 (Fed. Cir. 1991). For a deeper exploration of the predictable-unpredictable
dichotomy, see Sean B. Seymore, The Enablement Pendulum Swings Back, 6 Nw. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 278, 282-84 (2008) [hereinafter Seymore, Enablement Pendulum]; Seymore,

Heightened Enablement, supra note 15, at 136-54.
209. This factor has become increasingly important over the past decade as the Federal
Circuit has compelled patentees to enable the full scope of the claimed invention. See, e.g., ALZA
Corp. v. Andrx Pharms., LLC, 603 F.3d 935, 941-42 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that the district
court properly determined the PHOSITA's level of skill and did not err in giving less weight to a
witness who analyzed an issue using the wrong level of skill); AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac & Ugine,
344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (determining that where the claims covered a Type 1 or a
Type 2 aluminum coating, yet the patent only described a Type 2 coating, the claims were
nonenabled because a PHOSITA could not fill in the gaps without undue experimentation). For
commentary on the importance of the PHOSITA in the enablement context, see Seymore,
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For present purposes, the Wands factors are useful in two
respects. First, they provide the decisionmaker with a list of objective,
technical issues to consider in gauging enablement. Second, they are
well suited to handle inventions emerging from new, poorly
understood, and paradigm-shifting technologies, as well as those from
fields with a poor track record of success. Most (if not all) seemingly
impossible inventions can be so classified. 21 1 Thus, a decisionmaker
can use the factors to readily resolve whether a seemingly impossible
invention can achieve the intended result.
B. Formulatinga Screen
1. The Challenge
Given that enablement is a fact-intensive inquiry, 212 it stands
to reason that certain Wands factors can be more relevant than others
in a particular case. 2 13 It also stands to reason that for inventions
which have similar characteristics, the same subset of Wands factors
are always highly relevant since similar inventions present similar
enablement challenges. 214 In the case of seemingly impossible
inventions, the most relevant subset of factors are those closely
related to the PHOSITA's knowledge and abilities. To explain why, it
is helpful to consider the challenges faced by a PHOSITA who wants
to practice a seemingly impossible invention. Perhaps the major
challenge can be referred to as the knowledge deficit. In the
technologies from which seemingly impossible inventions usually
emerge, there tends to be little or no helpful knowledge from which
the PHOSITA can draw. The knowledge deficit can stem from a poor
track record of success, the paradigm-shifting nature of the

Enablement Pendulum, supra note 208, at 284-92; Seymore, Heightened Enablement, supra note
15, at 134-39.
210. Enablement places an outer limit on claim scope. Nat'l Recovery Techs., Inc. v.
Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
211. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 201-04 and accompanying text.
213. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Relatedly, a
decisionmaker need not evaluate each factor before making an enablement determination. Id.
214. See, e.g., Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting

that nascent technologies "must be enabled with a 'specific and useful teaching.' " (quoting
Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1367-68 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); In re Vaeck, 947
F.2d 488, 496 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that the requisite level of disclosure for an invention
involving predictable mechanical or electrical elements is less than that required for the
unpredictable arts).
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technology, or other reasons. 2 15 This means that determining the
PHOSITA's level of skill (being careful not to overestimate it)216 and
the technical scope and substance of the disclosure are very important
because the PHOSITA must rely heavily, if not exclusively, on the
instruction provided within the four corners of the patent document in
2 17
order to practice the invention.
Given the importance of the patent document, it is clear that
patentee
needs to provide a disclosure of high technical quality.
the
The best way to do this is with working examples. 218 They show with
actual technical detail that the invention can really achieve the
intended result. 2 19 As explained below, it is this technical detail that
215. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
216. Recall that enablement is always assessed retrospectively. See supra note 199.
Overestimating the PHOSITA's level of skill typically happens for two reasons. First, the
PHOSITA's knowledge and abilities can evolve over time, most notably between the time of filing
and the time of the enablement analysis. As Professor Holbrook has explained, "Enablement,
while conceptually simple, is legally and factually complex [because] whether a disclosure is
enabling can shift over time; as the knowledge of the PHOSITA shifts, an identical disclosure
may shift from not being enabled to being enabled." Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent
Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 130 (2006) (internal citation omitted) [hereinafter Holbrook,
Possession]; Timothy R. Holbrook, Equivalency and Patent Law's PossessionParadox, 23 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 1, 41-43 (2009) (making a similar argument). Second, there is the problem of
hindsight bias. It "will normally lead fact-finders to overestimate the level of skill in the art,
since subsequent advances will suggest that the invention could not have been that difficult to
do." Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology.Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1155, 1199 (2002); cf. Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: EmpiricalDemonstration
That the Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational,67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391, 1402 (2006)
("Critical for patent law, once individuals have hindsight information, they consistently
exaggerate what could have been anticipated in foresight and not only tend to view what has
occurred as having been inevitable, but also as having appeared relatively inevitable
beforehand."); R. Polk Wagner, ReconsideringEstoppel: PatentAdministration and the Failureof
Festo, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 159, 205 (2002) ("[In considering] enablement, which is measured
through the lens of the knowledge of the relevant field as of the filing date of the patent
application[,] [a]s the filing date becomes distant, the potential for cognitive biases, such as a
hindsight bias, increases.").
217. Cf. Chiron, 363 F.3d at 1254 (making a similar observation for inventions emerging
from unpredictable technologies).
218. Seymore, Teaching Function,supra note 15, at 642.
219. Mazzari v. Rogan, 323 F.3d 1000, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154
F.3d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). Of course, working examples vary in technical quality and
helpfulness to the PHOSITA. Relevant variables include how the research was performed (and in
particular, whether it was done according to the scientific method), the amount of information
disclosed, lucidity, logical reasoning, and other factors. See HEATHER SILYN-ROBERTS, WRITING
FOR SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING 39-44 (2000) (explaining how to disclose experimental results).
The broader point is that the presence of working examples does not necessarily guarantee
enablement. Importantly for present purposes, they must show a nexus between the claimed
result and the supporting evidence. In re Oelrich, 666 F.2d 578, 581 (C.C.P.A. 1981) ("The mere
fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient [to satisfy
enablement]."). The facts in the baldness case In re Cortright, 165 F.3d 1353, 1353 (Fed. Cir.
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makes the existence of working examples the most important Wands
factor for seemingly impossible inventions.
2. The Importance of Working Examples
It is axiomatic that the best way to teach a technical subject is
with working examples. 220 They lie at the core of technical
publications because they provide the best form of guidance and
direction for replicating what is disclosed therein. 221 In patent
documents, their presence "facilitates, if not ensures, enablement of
222
an invention."
Working examples can perform functions that extend beyond
teaching. Of particular importance for present purposes is an
evidentiary function. Providing a tangible method for achieving the
intended result establishes credibility by signaling that the underlying
research represents good science. 223 Indeed, working examples

1999), provide a good example. One claim at issue recited a method of treating the scalp with an
ointment in which the active ingredient reached the base of the hair follicle. Id. at 1355. The
court affirmed the PTO's rejection of this claim because the written description failed to provide
sufficient evidence, through actual observations or otherwise, which would allow a PHOSITA to
conclude that the ingredient actually reached the base of the hair follicle. Id. at 1360 (explaining
'
that the statements "[it is believed or "applicant surmises that" did not constitute actual
observations) (emphasis in original).
220. See, e.g., George Gore, On Practical Scientific Instruction, 7 Q.J. ScI. 215, 228 (1870)
(asserting that one who teaches a technical subject must teach with examples that should be full
of practical applications and familiar illustrations); Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 15,
at 641-54 (making a similar argument in the patent law context).
221. See, e.g., BERT A. DAY & BARBARA GASTEL, HOW TO WRITE AND PUBLISH A SCIENTIFIC
PAPER 61 (6th ed. 2006) (noting that disclosing the experimental methods is important because
the scientific community must adjudge the results reproducible before attaching scientific merit
to the work); SHAMOO & RESNIK, supra note 33, at 51 ('The ability of other investigators to
replicate the experiments by following the method in the published report is crucial to the
advancement of science.").
222. Bratislav Stankovic, The Use of Examples in Patent Applications, 18 INTELL. PROP. &
TECH. L.J. 9, 10 (2006). But, as with other forms of enablement, the breadth of the teaching
provided in a working example must be commensurate with the claim scope sought. See cases
cited supra note 192. A teaching which lacks specificity or provides inadequate guidance will
result in a narrow(ed) claim scope (Wands factor eight). BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 2, at 115.
223. See MARGARET CARGILL & PATRICK O'CONNOR, WRITING SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
ARTICLES 35 (2009) (noting that a goal for disclosing experimental procedures is to establish
credibility in the work); MARTHA DAVIS, SCIENTIFIC PAPERS AND PRESENTATIONS 61 (2005)
(explaining that the experimental section of a scientific paper "is the very foundation of the
scientific merit and feasibility of the work"); DAY & GASTEL, supra note 221, at 61 (arguing that
working examples are essential for showing that the potential for reproducing the result exists;
otherwise the work is not good science).
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distinguish good science from speculative theories by extinguishing
224
the fires of suspicion.
The facts in In re Eltgroth illustrate this point. 225 The applicant
claimed a method for controlling aging by manipulating the
226
concentration of isotopes of specific elements within an organism.
While the applicant produced scientific literature that taught how to
manipulate isotope concentrations, the applicant did not explain how
doing so could control aging. 227 The failure to provide a tangible
method for achieving the intended result led the PTO to reject the
claim under both § 112 1 and § 101.228 In affirming the rejection, the
C.C.P.A. noted the inadequate teaching and "a conspicuous absence of
proof' in the disclosure:
Not one example is given. Not one isotope [affecting] aging is identified .... Moreover,
appellant has.., failed to show how knowledge available to [PHOSITAs] would enable
them to make and use his invention despite the lack of specific
disclosure ....[A]ppellant
229
hypothesis ....

has provided no more than a speculative

theory

or

The applicant's inadequate teaching essentially required a
PHOSITA to engage in undue experimentation to achieve the intended
result.

230

Working examples also provide the best evidence that what
was impossible at one point in time is now possible (a Type III
impossibility).231 Similarly, the absence of working examples can
224. See David S. Wainwright, Patenting Around Nuisance Prior Art, 81 J. PAT. &
Soc'Y 221, 224 (1999) (explaining that patent applications that lack working
examples can raise suspicion because "[ilt
can be difficult for one outside the art to know whether
a specific item is enabling or not"); cf. In re Lorenz, 305 F.2d 875, 878 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (stating
that the strong and comprehensive language of § 112 evinces Congress's intent for applicants to
"make a full and complete disclosure of their invention, leaving nothing to speculation or doubt").
225. 419 F.2d 918, 918 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
226. Isotopes are atoms of a particular element with which differ in the number of neutrons.
Importantly, isotopes of a given element differ in chemical properties. See generally LINUS
TRADEMARK OFF.

PAULING, GENERAL CHEMISTRY (3d ed. 1988).

227. Eltgroth, 419 F.2d at 921.
228. Id. at 919-20. The PTO found a statement in Supreme Court opinion particularly
appropriate: "[A] patent is not a hunting license. It is not a reward for the search, but
compensation for its successful conclusion. [A] patent system must be related to the world of
commerce rather than to the realm of philosophy." Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 536 (1966)
(quoting In re Ruschig, 343 F.2d 965, 970 (C.C.P.A. 1965) (Rich, J.)).
229. Eltgroth, 419 F.2d at 921.
230. Id.
231. In other words, working examples can show that the state of the art has advanced far
enough to allow a PHOSITA to achieve the intended result. See discussion supra notes 37-39
and accompanying text. For instance, working examples helped convince the PTO and the courts
that it is possible to successfully treat cancer. Compare In re Citron, 325 F.2d 248, 249-53
(C.C.P.A. 1963) (explaining that applicants' invention relating to an alleged effective treatment
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signal that a putative invention is per se impossible (Type 1) or
pseudoscientific (Type II). Hence, enablement matters because there is
no way that an applicant claiming an invention falling into one of
these two categories can provide a working example that achieves the
232
intended result.
In sum, working examples allow § 112
1 to provide an
objective route to elucidating whether a seemingly impossible
invention can achieve the intended result. Given their central role in
the enablement analysis, it has been argued that there should be an
across-the-board working example requirement in patent law233 except
for inventions in which enablement "is so apparent as to virtually
234
jump off the page and slap a PHOSITA in the face."
C. Applying the Framework
The basic proposition of this Article is that the enablement
requirement of § 112
1 can effectively ferret out truly impossible
inventions by itself with no need for or help from its § 101 statutory
cousin. Part III.C.1 presents a hypothetical-based on an actual
patent case 235-illustrating the mechanics of the enablement-based
framework. Part III.C.2 explores the plausibility of the proposal.
for cancer, which lacked specific tests, experiments, or clinical data, asserted incredible utility in
the light of the knowledge of the art), with In re Jolles, 628 F.2d 1322, 1326-28 (C.C.P.A. 1980)
(concluding that clinical tests, combined with the close structural similarity of the claimed
compounds with chemotherapeutics known in the art, would allow a PHOSITA to accept the
claimed utility), and In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting that treating cancer
with chemical compounds "does not suggest an inherently unbelievable undertaking or involve
implausible scientific principles" because there are "numerous successful chemotherapeutic
agents").
232. Cf. Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 15, at 653 (arguing that it is easiest for an
examiner to gauge enablement when actual experimental results are disclosed).
233. See Seymore, Heightened Enablement, supra note 15, at 156-58; Seymore, Teaching
Function, supra note 15, at 641-54. Professor Cotropia also advocates an actual reduction to
practice requirement in patent law. See Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in
Patent Law, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 120-22 (2009) (proposing a framework wherein the PTO would
defer examination until the applicant submits evidence of actual implementation of the
invention).
234. Seymore, Heightened Enablement, supra note 15, at 156 n.15 (internal quotation marks
and brackets omitted); cf. Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc. 546 U.S. 454, 456-57 (2006) (per curiam)
(quoting Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F.3d 695, 732 (11th Cir. 2004)) (evaluating the "jump off
the page" standard in the context of an employment discrimination suit). Invoking a working
example requirement probably falls within the PTO's statutory authority. See supra note 82
(discussing the working model requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 114); Seymore, Teaching Function,
supranote 15, at 642 n.103 (same).
235. On May 7, 1897, Edward C. Brice filed a patent application claiming a process for
making gold from other elements. See H. Carrington Bolton, Recent Progress of Alchemy in
America, CHEMIcAL NEWS, Aug. 6, 1897, at 61-63 (describing the claimed method); Adolf G.

1532

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:5:1491

1. Mechanics
Suppose that an inventor files a patent application claiming a

method of using heat to transform antimony 236 into gold. 237 The

application discloses a working example, including the amount of
and
starting material (antimony) used, reaction conditions
238
temperatures, and the amount of product (gold) isolated.
An examiner with expertise in the field reads the application
and checks it for compliance with the statutory patentability
requirements. 239 Focusing on enablement, the patent application is
presumptively enabled as filed. 240 To establish a prima facie case of

nonenablement, 241 the examiner bears the initial burden of setting
forth a reasonable explanation as to why the enablement provided by
the applicant is not commensurate with the claim scope sought. 242 The
accuracy of any statement
examiner must explain any doubts as to the
243
with evidence or reasoning rooted in fact.

Vogeler, A Nineteenth Century Gold Factory, PHARM. J., Feb. 26, 1898, at 189-91 (presenting
additional experimental details).
236. Antimony is a chemical element typically obtained from complex mineral ores
containing lead, tin, zinc, silver, and gold. See NICHOLAS C. NORMAN, CHEMISTRY OF ARSENIC,
ANTIMONY, AND BISMUTH 43 (1998).
237. This claim sounds like alchemy: the transmutation of one chemical element into another
in a nonradioactive process. See supranote 26 and accompanying text.
238. In the actual case, the inventor shared his theory of transmutation with a reporter:
[Brice] depends almost entirely upon a decomposition of the atomic properties of the
antimony and a radical reconstruction as a new body [using] intense heat and the free
admission of oxygen. This is nature's process, and is exemplified in the volcanic action
by which most of the gold existing in a natural state was formed. [Some researchers
believe] that at some long-ago period tremendous convulsions of subterraneous gas
threw up from the earth's interior some metallic substance, which underwent a
transmutation into gold. [Brice chose antimony as a starting material] mainly because it
is found in considerable quantity [in] gold ores.
Chicago Alchemist Thinks that by Following in Nature's Pathway to Make Gold of Dross, CHI.
TRIB., Dec. 12, 1897, at 33. Brice built a gold-making factory in Chicago which processed over
10,000 pounds of crude ore per day. See Vogeler, supra note 235, at 189-90 (describing the daily
operation of the National Metallurgical Company).
239. See supra note 7 (reciting the conditions for patentability).
240. In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 223 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
241. An examiner must prove unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence. See In re
Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (articulating the burden-shifting framework used
in patent examination).
242. In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561-62 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
243. Marzocchi, 439 F.2d at 224; see also In re Brebner, 455 F.2d 1402, 1405 (C.C.P.A. 1972)
(holding that the PTO must provide a factual basis for a lack of enablement rejection, rather
than conclusory statements regarding the PHOSITA's level of skill).
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The examiner undertakes a Wands analysis by construing the
claim (factor seven),244 determining the PHOSITA's knowledge and
level of skill (factor five), 245 and evaluating the teaching provided in
the written description (factors one and two) 246 in light of the nature of
the technology (factors three and four). 247 Almost immediately, the
examiner recognizes that information pertaining to the source and
purity of the antimony is conspicuously absent from the disclosure.
Researchers in the field include this information as a matter of course
because impurities in starting materials can lead to irreproducible or
spurious results. 248 To bolster this reasoning, the examiner consults
the "antimony" entry in a chemical encyclopedia. It reveals that
"[m]ost of the antimony produced in the United States is from complex
antimony deposits found in Idaho, Nevada, Alaska, and Montana
[which] consist of [minerals containing] silver or gold."249 Based on the
totality of the evidence, 250 the examiner rejects the claim as prima
facie nonenabled under § 112
1 because a PHOSITA faced with the
inadequate guidance vis-a-vis the source and purity of the antimony
would have to engage in undue experimentation to achieve the
intended result.251
Next, the examiner sends the rejection to the applicant
accompanied with a request for information regarding the source and
purity of the antimony. 252 The applicant responds by disclosing that
244. See MPEP, supra note 47, § 2164.04 (instructing an examiner who suspects that one or
more claims lack enablement to first construe them to determine their scope); see also AK Steel
Corp. v. Sollac & Ugine, 344 F.3d 1234, 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (explaining that because a patent's
written description must enable the full scope of the claimed invention, the enablement inquiry
typically begins with a construction of the claims).
245. See supra notes 209 and 216 and accompanying text.
246. See supra note 207.
247. See supra note 208.
248. See MAXINE LINTERN, LABORATORY SKILLS FOR SCIENCE AND MEDICINE 64-65 (2007)

(explaining that the methods section should contain information including the commercial
supplier from which materials were purchased so that a competent researcher can read the
recipe and repeat exactly what was done). Laboratory chemicals vary widely in degrees of purity.
See, e.g., CHEMICAL TECHNICIANS' READY REFERENCE HANDBOOK 571 (Gershon J. Shugar & Jack
T. Ballinger eds., 4th ed. 1996) (listing grades of purity).
249. 3 KIRK-OTHMER ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHEMICAL TECHNOLOGY 42 (Arza Seidel ed., 5th ed.
2007) (emphasis added).
250. See MPEP, supra note 47, § 2164.01(a) (citing In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 740 (Fed. Cir.
1988)) (reminding examiners that "any conclusion of nonenablement must be based on the
evidence as a whole").
251. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
252. During the course of patent examination, the examiner may request "[tiechnical
information known to [the] applicant concerning.., the disclosure, the claimed subject matter,
other factual information pertinent to patentability, or concerning the accuracy of the examiner's
stated interpretation of such item." 37 C.F.R. § 1.105 (a)(1)(viii) (2009).
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the antimony is technical grade (lowest purity) obtained from Acme
Metals Company in Yellow Pine, Idaho. 253 Further research reveals
that Yellow Pine has one of the largest gold-antimony deposits in the
nation 254 and that Acme's technical grade antimony contains ten
percent gold by weight. The examiner performs a calculation revealing
that the amount of gold reported in the applicant's working example is
less than the amount of gold known to be present in the antimony
starting material. These facts lead the examiner to conclude that the
applicant did not transform antimony into gold but merely recovered a
fraction of the gold already present in the starting material. 255 When
presented with this information, the applicant decides to abandon the
256
application.
The foregoing hypothetical illustrates two important points.
First, it shows that a Wands analysis can ferret out a truly impossible
invention by itself without a subjective credibility assessment. The
claimed method in the hypothetical involves alchemy. 257 Aside from
being a Type I impossibility, 258 modern alchemistic claims often
conjure up notions of fraud. 259 Yet, the examiner did not need to
venture down the credibility path because obtaining more detail about
the working example revealed the applicant's error.

253. Technical grade, the lowest chemical grade, "is used industrially, but is generally
unsuitable for laboratory [use] because of the presence of many impurities." CHEMICAL
TECHNICIANS' READY REFERENCE HANDBOOK, supranote 248, at 571.

254. See, e.g., Junius Larsen & William C. Peters, Idaho, 45 INDUS. & ENGINGEERING
CHEMISTRY 2424, 2424-31 (1953) (describing the deposits).

255. The story in the actual case is quite interesting. After receiving two inoperability
rejections, Brice asked the PTO for permission to demonstrate the claimed process. See Bolton,
supra note 235, at 62. Since the PTO lacked laboratory facilities, the Secretary of the Treasury
allowed Brice to use the spacious facilities at the U.S. Mint. Id. The Director of the Mint bought
the requisite materials from reputable dealers and directed three experts to carry out the
claimed process. After conducting replicate experiments, the experts reported that the claimed
process failed to recover the entire amount of gold known to be present in the starting material,
leading them to conclude that there was "not the slightest evidence of any 'creation' or
transmutation." Id. at 62-64 (reproducing the Report to the Honorable R. E. Preston, Director of
the Mint, Washington, D.C. (May 22, 1897)). As to the final disposition, Brice argued that the
PTO rejected his application out of fear of a "monetary panic." Vogeler, supra note 235, at 189.
256. Of course, the applicant could try to salvage something and seek a patent claiming a
method of separating gold from antimony. However, that claim would be subject to novelty,
nonobviousness, and other patentability hurdles. See supra note 7.
257. See supra notes 26 and 237 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text. But see Vogeler, supra note 235, at 190
("No one should presume to pronounce the transmutation of one element into another an
impossibility, but it seems an infinite improbability.").
259. WILLIAM R. NEWMAN & LAWRENCE M. PRINCIPLE, ALCHEMY TRIED IN THE FIRE 12

(2005); see also HERBERT S. REDGROVE, BYGONE BELIEFS 102 (1999) (contrasting "genuine"
alchemists of ancient times with those who entered the quest in modern times).
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Second, it shows that many incredible claims can be traced to
faulty experimental technique. 260 As the late Professor John Ziman
explained in his book Real Science, experimental researchers must
work under "carefully contrived circumstances" where "all other
potential disturbing factors are eliminated" so that "the explanation
for the observed [result is] something more interesting than, say, an
impure chemical reagent .... -"261 In patent law, as in other contexts, a
careful examination of the examples provided can readily reveal
whether an intended result stems from sloppy research.
2. Plausibility
There is some decisional law that supports the proposition that
if the case for nonenablement is very strong, then that is a sufficient
base from which to deny patentability notwithstanding deficiencies
under § 101. In In re Speas,262 the applicant sought to claim "any and
all devices and systems which operate in such a manner as to violate
the [S]econd [L]aw of [T]hermodynamics as it is currently understood
and accepted as inviolable by a majority of the worldwide scientific
community," and "any and all devices and systems which are adapted
for converting thermal energy into other energy forms by contacting a
heat source without the necessity of also contacting a thermal medium
of lower temperature. 2 63
Two things stand out. First, the "any and all" claim language
immediately raises enablement concerns due to its potentially
limitless breadth. 264 Second, any device that could continuously
convert heat completely to work without any additional energy input
would violate the Second Law of Thermodynamics. 265 A closer look at
the applicant's description of the invention reveals, however, that the

260. ZIMAN, supra note 92, at 94.
261. Id.
262. 273 F. App'x 945 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (nonprecedential).
263. Id. at 946 (emphasis added).
264. See In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561-62 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (holding that the applicant
failed to enable a claim covering "any and all live, non-pathogenic vaccines, and processes for
making these vaccines").
265. The Second Law of Thermodynamics states that it is impossible to convert heat
completely to work without some energy loss. R. K. RAJPUT, ENGINEERING THERMODYNAMICS 232
(3d ed. 2010). A machine that could do so would be one hundred percent efficient. Such machines
are referred to as perpetual motion machines of the second kind. Id. Curiously, the term
"perpetual motion" does not appear either in the PTO documents or in the Federal Circuit
opinion.
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disclosed device does not do so because it actually draws in thermal
266
energy from the surroundings.
The examiner rejected the claim independently under § 112 1
and § 101, respectively, after determining that: (1) the enablement
provided was not commensurate with the claim scope sought; and (2)
the invention could not achieve the intended result. 267 The Board
explicitly affirmed each rejection. 268 Although the PTO argued both
issues in its appeal brief to the Federal Circuit, it contended that the
court could resolve the case solely on enablement grounds with no need
to reach the § 101 issue. 269 This argument makes sense because if the
device did not violate the Second Law of Thermodynamics, the
applicant's disclosure would be nonenabling.
The Federal Circuit adopted this reasoning and affirmed on
nonenablement grounds. The court held that the Board's rejection was
supported by substantial evidence because the applicant's
"particularly broad" and "limitless" claim was not enabled by a
description which was commensurately broad in its teaching. 270 The
important point is that it was possible to screen out this invention
solely based on (a lack of) technical merit; thereby avoiding any need
271
to engage in a credibility assessment.
Both Speas and the hypothetical presented above show that
whether an invention can achieve the intended result is a yes-or-no
question. If the answer is no, then § 112
1 alone can resolve the
issue because there is no way that the applicant can provide an
enabling description for a true impossibility. 272 In other words, a
266. See Speas, 273 F. App'x at 946 ('Thus, the movement of the ferrofluid imparts
mechanical energy upon the wheel. Speas claims that because this ferrofluid is moved and adds
energy to the paddle wheel 'without input into the system other than ambient thermal energy,' it
is proof that the second law of thermodynamics is not inviolate-an object of the invention.").
267. Id.; see also Brief for Appellee Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office at 7-8,
In re Speas, 273 F. App'x 945 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (No. 2008-1076).
268. Brief for Appellee, supra note 267, at 9-10.
269. Id. at 18. For support for this reasoning, see Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp., 724 F.2d 951,
956 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("[When a claim requires a means for accomplishing an unattainable result,
the claimed invention must be considered inoperative as claimed and the claim must be held
invalid under either § 101 or § 112 of 35 U.S.C." (emphasis added)).
270. Speas, 273 F. App'x at 946.
271. In his commentary on Speas, Professor Crouch reached a similar conclusion: "Although
this type of case is fun to read, it also provides an interesting lesson-that [there are] tools to
reject inadequate patent applications on their merits without resorting to broad exclusions of
particular subject matter." Dennis Crouch, CAFC Rejects Patent on Invention to Overcome the
Second Law of Thermodynamics, PATENTLY-O, May 1, 2008, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/
2008/05/cafc-rejects-pa.html.
272. Cf. Raytheon, 724 F.2d at 956 ("[B]ecause the impossible cannot be enabled, a claim
containing a limitation impossible to meet may be held invalid under § 112.").
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careful examination of the working example will reveal the fatal
flaw. 273 Analytically, this means that the decisionmaker can use
technical factors like claim breadth and the substantive content of the
applicant's disclosure to achieve the same ends as the current
operability regime but without the current pitfalls. This approach
would also streamline patent examination because the examiner
would not need to expend the time and effort formulating and building
274
a record to support multiple rejections for a single issue.
D. Policy Tradeoffs
1. Disclosure
Replacing the § 101 operability regime with an enablementbased framework elevates the role of the applicant's disclosure 27 5 and
the PHOSITA's level of skill in resolving the workability question. The
key metric for gauging enablement in the proposed framework is the
276
working example. But the idea of ratcheting up enablement,
especially through a working example requirement, implicates a
larger debate over the appropriate role of disclosure in patent
277
policy.

273. See ROBERT L. PARK, VOODOO SCIENCE 9 (2002) ("Error is a normal part of science, and
uncovering flaws in scientific observations or reasoning is the everyday work of scientists.");
JOHN WALLER, FABuLOuS SCIENCE 40 (2004) (noting that an experimental result can be "so
aberrant that error seems the most reasonable explanation").
274. See supra text accompanying note 195.
275. The disclosure is the technical information provided in the patent application about the
invention (including working examples). As discussed above, the disclosure must satisfy the
requirements of § 112 1 1, including enablement, adequate written description of the invention,
and the revelation of the best mode of carrying it out. See supra note 47.
276. Other commentators have argued for a robust enablement requirement. See, e.g., Mark
D. Janis, On Courts Herding Cats: Contending with the 'Written Description"Requirement (and
Other Unruly Patent Disclosure Doctrines), 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 55, 108 (2000) (arguing that
a vigorous enablement requirement could lead to the development of more coherent patentability
guidelines).
277. Patent scholars differ in their views on the role of the disclosure. Compare Holbrook,
Possession, supra note 216, at 126, 133-47 (describing the "pervasive" role of disclosure in patent
law and policy, including enriching the state of the art contemporaneously with the invention
and showing evidence of possession of the invention), and Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure,
94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 547-54 (2009) (cataloguing the beneficial uses for disclosure in patent law;
including stimulating innovation, preventing duplication, gauging patentability, and signaling
R&D strength), with Alan Devlin, The Misunderstood Function of the Disclosure in Patent Law,
23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401, 412 (2010) (arguing that "disclosure as an objective of patent policy
should be discarded in certain circumstances" because it "serves no more than an ancillary role
within the larger purpose of the patent regime").
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Clearly the enablement analysis is easiest when the applicant
can point to actual experimental results as proof that the invention
works. Such results are a prerequisite for communal acceptance in
279
mainstream science.27 8 Patent law, however, is not so demanding.
28 0
Actual experimentation is not a prerequisite for patenting.
It is understandable why an inventor may choose to file a
patent application with minimal teaching. First, most would agree
that for simple inventions, there is no need for experimentation if the
technology is so easy to understand that a PHOSITA can readily
figure out the details. 28 1 Second, sometimes inventors must obtain
patents at an early stage of R&D (well before identifying a marketable
product) in order to attract investors. 28 2 Third, applicants must often
file early in order to safeguard patent rights both in the United
28 4
States 28 3 and abroad.
Patent theory posits that early filing facilitates the entry of
new technical knowledge into the public domain, 28 5 which in turn
serves as building blocks for further innovation. 28 6 Filing too early,
278. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
279. See supra Part II.A.2.
280. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
281. See discussion supra note 208 (noting that the PHOSITA needs less guidance in
predictable fields). For a concrete example, see Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 15, at
644 (contending that for a patent claiming a broom rake, a PHOSITA would not benefit from a
working example because the technology is easily understood).
282. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiving Patents in the Age of Venture Capital, 4 J.
SMALL & EMERGING BuS. L. 137, 144 (2000) ("[Olne of the reasons people are patenting at a very
early stage in the process is precisely in order to attract or appease venture capital.").
283. For example, an applicant must file a patent application within one year of disclosing
the invention in a printed publication. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). Likewise, if the invention is
used in public, sold, or subject to an offer for sale in the United States, the applicant must file
within one year of the event. Id. A fundamental purpose of § 102(b) is to encourage prompt filing.
Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Similarly,
§ 102(g) "penaliz[es] the unexcused delay or failure of a first inventor to share the benefit of the
knowledge of the invention with the public after the invention has been completed." Checkpoint
Sys., Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 54 F.3d 756, 761 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
284. The one-year grace period available in the United States is not available in many
foreign countries. In fact, most countries have an absolute novelty requirement such that any
prefiling disclosure, including activity by the inventor, is patent-defeating. See, e.g., Convention
on the Grant of European Patents, art. 54(2), Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 255, 272. Accordingly,
if foreign filing is a possibility, the applicant must take steps to avoid inadvertent or premature
disclosure. DAVID A. BURGE, PATENT & TRADEMARK TACTICS AND PRACTICE 127-36 (3d ed. 1999).
285. See John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439,
445 (2004) (arguing that early filing leads to reduced patent terms, thereby dedicating the
invention to the public at an earlier time).
286. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989); see also
Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (noting that one goal of patent law is
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28 7 Of
however, can have serious consequences for the patent system.
particular importance for present purposes are two problems that
arise from disclosing and patenting an underdeveloped invention.
First, a feeble, nontechnically robust disclosure enters into the patent
literature, which provides dubious guidance to the PHOSITA, adds
little or nothing to the public storehouse of knowledge, and supplies
28 8
little technical fodder for follow-on researchers to build upon.
Second, roadblocks are created for other inventors, 28 9 including the
ability to dominate other technological innovations that only
subsequent workers in the field can actually enable. 290 An across-the"[to] promote a disclosure of inventions to stimulate further innovation"); Transco Prods. Inc. v.
Performance Contracting, Inc., 38 F.3d 551, 558 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (rejecting an interpretation of
§ 112 which would "subvert the patent system's goal of... encouraging early disclosure."); W.L.
Gore & Assocs. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("Early public disclosure the
linchpin of the patent system.") (citation omitted).
287. See, e.g., Cotropia, supra note 233, at 87-119 (presenting a comprehensive analysis of
the costs of early filing on the patent system); Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 15, at 659
(arguing that the current disclosure framework can thwart innovation).
288. In other words, the disclosure probably lacks sufficient technical detail to be helpful.
Thus, it does little to advance technological progress, which is commanded by the Constitution.
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).
289. A good example is when an early filer strategically drafts claims which cover
undeveloped technology. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 121, at 67 (arguing that the practice
"penalizes real innovators who operate in the shadow of early, broad claims"); Michael J. Meurer
& Craig Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement and Patent Claim Scope: A New Perspective on the
Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEo. L.J. 1947, 1975 (2005) (exploring the practice).
290. Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 15, at 660. Another commentator elaborates on
the scope and consequences of the problem:
The further a patent moves away from a requirement that the inventor actually have a
complete and operative invention [at the time of filing], the broader the patent's scope
and the greater potential that the [claims] will protect speculative ideas ... With just a
little time, money, and imagination, one may... without inventing anything... [obtain
a patent with] claims that are broad enough to [encompass] technology developed for the
first time years after the inventor first files an application .... [This can have] an
undue chilling effect on the behavior of later scientists [and] researchers ... who
(sometimes many years later) through their own experimentation, hard work, and trial
and error[,] succeed in [creating] a bona fide product or process that actually works.
Christopher A. Harkins, Fending Off Paper Patents and Patent Trolls: A Novel "Cold Fusion"
Defense Because Changing Times Demand It, 17 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 407, 453 (2007). A good
illustration involves Type III impossibilities, which were defined earlier as quests which are
impossible at time X but might become possible at time Y. See supra Part I.B. Suppose inventor
A obtains a patent at time X and inventor B obtains a patent for a new and nonobvious
improvement at time Y. In order to practice the improvement, B must get a license from A. See
Merges & Nelson, supranote 192, at 860-61 (explaining dominant and subservient patents). If B
wants to avoid a license, B must challenge A's patent in court and prove by clear and convincing
evidence that A's presumptively valid patent is invalid for nonenablement. ALZA Corp. v. Andrx
Pharms., LLC, 603 F.3d 935, 940 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Also, B may have a hard time getting the
improvement patent because the PTO can assert the disclosure of A's patent as prior art against
B's claim, most likely for a lack of nonobviousness. See 35 U.S.C. § 103. To make matters worse
for B, the Federal Circuit has held that the examiner can presume that A's disclosure is enabled,
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board working-example requirement would ameliorate, if not
29 1
eliminate, each of these problems.
Although it is perhaps counterintuitive, an enablement-based
approach might actually attract inventors to the patent system who
would otherwise forego the patenting process under the status quo. To
unpack this argument, consider that inventors claiming the
impossible (or for that matter, any invention) want to believe that
they will get-and are, in fact, entitled to-a fair shot at getting a
patent. However, inventors who believe that the PTO and the courts
are biased against granting patents for certain types of inventions
(which is likely under a regime rooted in subjective credibility
assessments) may decide not to waste their time and money pursuing
a patent if a denial is inevitable. 292 Put simply, "inventors respond to
how the Patent Office behaves." 293 Under the enablement-based
approach proposed herein, an inventor with a seemingly impossible
claim who knows that it will receive an objective, technical
examination might decide to try getting a patent. This will give the
patent system the benefit of a disclosure that it otherwise would lose.
2. Promoting Scientific and Technological Progress
With any proposed patent reform we might ask how it aligns
with the patent system's overarching goal to promote scientific and
technological progress. 294 As explained below, an objective,
meaning that the examiner need not elucidate if what A discloses really works. Amgen Inc. v.
Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also Seymore, Rethinking
Novelty, supra note 15, at 940-46 (criticizing this presumption). To win, B must rebut the
presumption by a preponderance of the evidence. In re Sasse, 629 F.2d 675, 681 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
The basic point is that in both cases B has to prove nonenablement for a patent that never
should have issued. Cf. Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763, 765 (2002) (suggesting that concerns related to the PTO's issuance of
"facially" invalid patents may stem from the examiner's inability to accurately determine the
scope and content of the prior art).
291. See Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 15, at 652-66.
292. This is the case for perpetual motion and cold fusion, which automatically raise red
flags in the PTO. See supra notes 4-6, 81-82 and accompanying text. Again, a working example
requirement would eliminate the need for special treatment.
293. JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 3, at 175.
294. This goal emanates from the Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution: 'To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 8; see also Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3236 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(explaining that Intellectual Property Clause empowered Congress "to pass a series of patent
laws.., as a means of encouraging innovation"); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 223 (2003)
(noting that the constitutional command is the "ultimate purpose" of the patent system); Motion
Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 511 (1917) (observing that "the
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enablement-based approach for elucidating whether an invention
works is better suited for achieving this goal than the current
operability regime.
Recall that at present the examiner turns to mainstream
science to answer the workability question. 295 Elucidating whether an
invention "borders on the incredible in light of contemporary
knowledge [in the field],"296 "suggest[s] an inherently unbelievable
undertaking,"297 "involve[s] implausible scientific principles," 298 or
"appear[s] to run counter to what would be believed would happen"299
depends on what the scientific community views as credible at a
particular moment in time. And it will not give its imprimatur to a
research claim unless and until it passes through the knowledge filter.
If an inventor seeks a patent before this happens, then the credibility
lag will lead to a patent denial regardless of the claim's technical
merit. 30 0 Clearly such a regime prevents patent law from sitting at the
30 1
cutting edge of science and technology.
This artifact of the operability regime conflicts with the
fundamental goal of the patent system-that is, to encourage the
rapid dissemination of technical knowledge. 30 2 As soon as a patent

primary purpose of our patent laws ... is 'to promote the progress of science and useful arts' ").
Scholars have sought to clarify the meaning of the constitutional language. See, e.g., EDWARD
WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE 125-26 (2002)
(explaining that in the latter part of the eighteenth century, the term "science" was synonymous
with "knowledge" and "learning); Karl B. Lutz, Patents and Science: A Clarificationof the Patent
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50, 54 (1949) (noting that the term
"useful arts" is synonymous with the word "technology").
295. See supra Part II.B.1.
296. In re Ferens, 417 F.2d 1072, 1074 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
297. In re Jolles, 628 F.2d 1322, 1327 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
298. In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
299. In re Pottier, 376 F.2d 328, 330 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
300. See supra Part II.B.2.
301. See supra notes 188-189 and accompanying text.
302. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 533 (1966) ("[O]ne of the purposes of the patent
system is to encourage dissemination of information concerning discoveries and inventions."); see

also Malla Pollack, What is Congress Supposed to Promote? Defining "Progress"in Article 1,
Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution,or Introducing the ProgressClause, 80 NEB.
L. REV. 754, 778-79 (2001) (arguing that the Intellectual Property Clause empowers Congress to
create an individual right to exclude through patents only to the extent that those rights promote
the dissemination of knowledge). The statutory scheme helps achieve this goal. As discussed
above, a fundamental purpose of both § 102(b) and § 102(g) is to encourage prompt filing. See
supra note 283. In addition, recent amendments to the patent statutes facilitate quicker
dissemination. For instance, until recently, patent applications were kept in secret unless and
until the patent issued. Now, most patent applications filed on or after November 29, 2000,
publish eighteen months after the earliest effective filing date. See American Inventors
Protection Act of 1999, 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A) (2006).
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document publishes,3 0 3 there is hope that the public will use the
technical details disclosed therein to improve upon the invention, to
design around it, or to engage in other innovative activities. 30 4 This is
where enablement enters the picture. It plays the central role in
"safeguard[ing] the patent system's disclosure function by ensuring
relatively swift dissemination of technical information from which
others.., can learn. '30 5 And the knowledge gained will reduce R&D
waste, 30 6 spur creativity, 30 7 and ultimately extend the frontiers of
3
science and technology. 08
The preceding discussion highlights the related yet dissimilar
ways that mainstream science and patent law seek to promote
scientific and technological progress. Clearly both patent law and
303. See supra note 302 (discussing the pregrant publication of patent applications).
304. Fromer, supra note 277, at 541. Importantly, the public can engage in these activities
during the patent term. As the late Judge Giles S. Rich once explained:
Another aspect of what we think of as "the patent" which should not be forgotten is that
it is not only a grant of right to exclude from the government; simultaneously, it is a
publication, making (in principle at least) a full public disclosure of the invention due to
§ 112 1. So even if it does not go into the public domain during the patent term, the
public gets the advantage of knowing what the invention is and how to practice it.
("Literae patentes" = "open letters," in short form, "patents.") ....
Janice M. Mueller, A Rich Legacy, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 895, 900 (1999) (quoting an email
from Judge Giles S. Rich, Circuit Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, to
Professor Janice M. Mueller (Aug. 16, 1997)). But, Professor Holbrook argues that the Federal
Circuit's evisceration of the common law experimental use exception means that "[o]ne can read
the patent but cannot make or use the invention for purposes of exploring its function or the
manner in which it works [without risking infringement]." Holbrook, Possession,supra note 216,
at 140; see also Ted Hagelin, The Experimental Use Exemption to Patent Infringement:
Information on Ice, Competition on Hold, 58 FLA. L. REV. 483, 494-504 (2006) (making a similar
argument).
305. FTC Report, supra note 79, ch. 4, at 3-4; see also LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res.
Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (describing enablement as the essential
aspect of the patent bargain); 3 CHISUM, supra note 134, § 7.01 (explaining that among the
disclosure requirements, enablement has the deepest historical roots and 'lies at the heart of the
patent bargain").
306. Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247,
267 n.79 (1994); see also Anthony Murphy, Intellectual Property, in INNOVATION: HARNESSING
CREATIVITY FOR BUSINESS GROWTH 87, 92 (Adam Jolly ed., 2003) (arguing that since patent
applications contain a complete description of the relevant technology and are readily accessible
online, "[w]hy struggle to solve a technical problem already solved by another and published in [a
patent] application?"). One could argue that any delay of entry into the patent system caused by
the need to make working examples could actually set the stage for duplicative research efforts.
However, it is probably rare that researchers are working on the identical problem in exactly the
same way at the same moment in time.
307. See MICHAEL A. GOLLIN, DRIVING INNOVATION 15-19 (2008) (explaining that disclosure
adds to the pool of accessible knowledge that other creative individuals can use and improve
upon).
308. See ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 6 (2004)
(noting that patents enrich the public domain and thus support further innovation).
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science seek to foster innovative activity through the dissemination of
technical knowledge. 30 9 But then the divergence occurs. Whereas
mainstream science emphasizes legitimization of technical knowledge
through peer review, patent law emphasizes its quick communication
to the public. As long as the patentee provides sufficient information
about the invention so that others can understand and practice it,310
ancillary details such as the inventor's acumen 31' or how or why the
312
invention works are irrelevant.
Some may argue that patent law's indifference to the ancillary
details deviates from scientific norms inasmuch as there is an
inevitable trade-off between rapid dissemination and credibility. But
herein lies the problem: it is not the province of patent law to
determine what constitutes credible science; that task belongs

309. In particular, both mainstream science and patent law promote disclosure through
publication. Once in the public domain, there is hope that others will build upon those results
and engage in further research. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, ProprietaryRights and Norms of
Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 184 (1987) (exploring the compatibility and
conflicts between the norms of science and patent law). But Professor Eisenberg also points out
that to the extent that patent protection "limit[s] the ability of other scientists to use published
knowledge, intellectual property law has been perceived within the scientific research
community as conflicting with the traditional norms and rewards of science." Id.; see also
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental
Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1017 (1989) ("Yet the idea that exclusive rights in new knowledge
will promote scientific progress is counterintuitive to many observers of research science, who
believe that science advances most rapidly when the community enjoys free access to new
discoveries.").
310. See J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001)
(explaining that to obtain a patent, the applicant "must describe the [invention] with sufficient
specificity to enable others to 'make and use' the invention after the patent term expires"
(quoting 35. U.S.C. § 112
1)). Here it is worth noting that quests which are per se impossible
(Type 1) or pseudoscientific (Type II) can nevertheless produce knowledge which promotes
scientific and technological progress. As one commentator explains:
The pursuit of the perpetual motion machine ... has not been fruitless from a scientific point of
view. On the contrary, although inventors have never produced a perpetual motion machine, the
enormous time and energy invested into building such a fabled machine has led physicists to
carefully study the nature of heat engines. (In the same way, the fruitless search of alchemists
for [a method to] turn lead into gold[] helped to uncover some of the basic laws of chemistry.)
KAKU, supra note 24, at 262-63.
311. See Eames v. Andrews (The Driven-Well Cases), 122 U.S. 40, 56 (1887) (explaining that
an inventor's ignorance of the scientific principles is immaterial as long as the patent's disclosure
sets forth the "thing" to be done so that it can be reproduced); Radiator Specialty Co. v. Buhot, 39
F.2d 373, 376 (3d Cir. 1930) ("It is with the inventive concept, the thing achieved, not with the
manner of its achievement or the quality of the mind which gave it birth, that the patent law
concerns itself."); Earle v. Sawyer, 8 F. Cas. 254, 256 (C.C.D. Mass. 1825) (No. 4,247) (Story, J.)
("It is of no consequence, whether the thing be simple or complicated; whether it be by accident,
or by long, laborious thought ... that it is first done [because the] law looks to the fact, and not
to the process by which it is accomplished.").
312. See cases cited supra note 56.
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primarily to the scientific community. 313 This is why the proposed
enablement-based framework is better suited for fulfilling patent law's
overarching goal of promoting science and technological progress than
what prevails today. And, quite fortuitously, the across-the-board
working example requirement advocated herein would ameliorate
concerns about credibility.
CONCLUSION

Encouraging the attainment of previously unachievable results
is a fundamental facet of the patent system. While success clearly
benefits the public through new products and processes, the quest to
achieve the impossible itself generates a body of technical knowledge
that can spur creative activity, foster innovation, and extend the
frontiers of science and technology. Yet, the patent system struggles to
achieve these ends due to the subjective facets of the current patent
examination framework. By adopting an objective approach to gauging
patentability for seemingly impossible inventions based on technical
merit, the proposed framework will resolve these problems, promote
broader goals of patent policy, and contribute to broader debates about
the intersection between patent law and science and technology.

313. See, e.g., CHUBIN & HACKET, supra note 93, at 4 (arguing that aside from asserting the
autonomy and authority of science, peer review "makes new knowledge claims more credible to
the nonscientist because [they] bear the approval of the scientific community"). But see Brooktree
Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (explaining that
"[w]hile utility and enablement often involve complex scientific principles, the Federal Circuit
views them not as "legal abstractions," but as issues "[which] properly devolve on the trier of
fact" who, as for other kinds of evidence, "must make determinations of credibility, reliability,
and weight"). Despite the drawbacks in using credibility assessments for patentability purposes,
they can be useful in other contexts. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579,
592-94 (1993) (setting forth a five-part test for U.S. judges to evaluate the credibility of scientific
testimony for admissibility purposes).

